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Lawyers wishing to exercise a meaningful degree of leadership at the intersection of
technology and the law could benefit greatly from a deep understanding of the use and application
of encryption, considering it arises in so many legal scenarios. For example, in FTC v.
Wyndham1 the defendant failed to implement nearly every conceivable cybersecurity control,
including lack of encryption for stored data, resulting in multiple data breaches and a consequent
FTC enforcement action for unfair and deceptive practices. Other examples of legal issues
requiring use of encryption and other technology concepts include compliance with security
requirements of GLBA & HIPAA, encryption safe harbors relative to state data breach
notification laws and the CCPA, the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, and PCI standards.
Further, some policy discussions have taken place in 2020 regarding encrypted DNS over
HTTPS, and lawyers would certainly seem to benefit from a better understanding of relevant
encryption concepts to assess the privacy effectiveness of emerging encryption technologies, such as
encrypted DNS. Finally, the need for technology education for lawyers is evidenced by North
Carolina and Florida requiring one or more hours in technology CLE and New York in 2020
moving toward required CLE in the area of cybersecurity specifically.
This article observes that there is a continuing desire for strong encryption mechanisms to
advance the privacy interests of civilians’ online activities/communications (e.g., messages or web
browsing). Law enforcement advocates for a “front door,” requiring tech platforms to maintain
a decryption mechanism for online data, which they must produce upon the government providing
a warrant. However, privacy advocates may encourage warrant-proof encryption mechanisms
where tech platforms remove their ability to ever decrypt. This extreme pro-privacy position
could be supported based on viewing privacy interests under a lens such as Blackstone’s ratio.
Just as the Blackstone ratio principle favors constitutional protections that allow ten guilty people
to go free rather than allowing one innocent person suffer, individual privacy rights could
arguably favor fairly unsurveillable encrypted communications at the risk of not detecting various
criminal activity. However, given that the internet can support large-scale good or evil activity,
law enforcement continues to express a desire for a front door required by legislation and subject
to suitable privacy safeguards, striking a balance between strong privacy versus law enforcement’s
need to investigate serious crimes. In the last few decades, law enforcement appears to have lost
the debate for various reasons, but the debate will likely continue for years to come.
For attorneys to exercise meaningful leadership in evaluating the strength of encryption
technologies relative to privacy rights, attorneys must generally understand encryption principles,
how these principles are applied to data at rest (e.g., local encryption), and how they operate
with respect to data in transit. Therefore, this article first explores encryption concepts primarily
with regard to data at rest and then with regard to data in transit, exploring some general
networking protocols as context for understanding how encryption can applied to data in transit,
protecting the data payload of a packet and/or the routing/header information (i.e., the “from”
and “to” field) of the packet.
Part 1 of this article briefly explores the need for lawyers to understand encryption.
Part 2 provides a mostly technical discussion of encryption concepts, with some legal concepts
injected therein. Finally, Part 3 provides some high level legal discussion relevant to encryption
(including arguments for and against law enforcement’s desire for a front door). To facilitate
1

F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
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THE NEED FOR LAWYERS TO UNDERSTAND ENCRYPTION

A. ABOUT FTC V. WYNDHAM: A LAUNCHING POINT FOR DISCUSSION OF
ENCRYPTION

FTC v. Wyndham is a 2015 Third Circuit opinion, which upheld the FTC’s
authority to fine the Wyndham hotel chain for cybersecurity shortcomings. On
three occasions in 2008 and 2009, hackers successfully accessed Wyndham
Worldwide Corporation’s computer systems.2 “In total, they stole personal and
financial information for hundreds of thousands of consumers leading to over
$10.6 million dollars in fraudulent charges. The FTC filed suit in federal District
Court, alleging that Wyndham’s conduct was an unfair practice and that its
privacy policy was deceptive” for misrepresenting that it had good security
controls (including representing it had encryption in place).3
The court identified a laundry list of cybersecurity shortcomings, including:
(1) lack of firewalls, (2) lack of encryption, (3) lack of an incident response plan,
(4) easily guessed passwords, (5) failure to maintain an inventory of assets, and
(6) failure to implement software updates.4 This article does not address all of
the cybersecurity shortcomings in Wyndham. Rather, it focuses on the very
important encryption component as a helpful starting point for understanding
cybersecurity.
1. The Need for Lawyers to Understand Encryption
Understanding encryption is certainly relevant in light of ABA Rule 1.1 (duty
of technological competence), Rule 1.6 (duty of confidentiality), a variety of
statutes directly or indirectly requiring encryption, encryption as a means to
reduce negligence exposure, etc.5 The ABA has commented that attorneys must
understand and use encryption in practice.6 By doing so, lawyers then can
understand how their companies/firms utilize encryption, as well as understand
the errors, use, and decisions regarding encryption exercised by their adversaries
in litigation.7 Perhaps more importantly, understanding the underlying
mechanics and usage of encryption will help lawyers maximize protection of

Wyndham Worldwide, 799 F.3d at 241.
Id. at 240.
4 Id. at 241.
5
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2020); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2020).
6
Daniel Garrie & Rick Borden, Encryption for Lawyers, 2016 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. BUS. L.
TODAY 1, 1, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/06/f
ull-issue-201606.pdf.
7
Id.
2
3
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client information and protection of themselves.8 Due to the tremendous
amount of highly sensitive information today that gets transmitted over the
internet, law firms cannot only rely on their Information Technology (IT)
department, but also must teach and make sure their employees understand how
to encrypt their data and maximize password security to secure the company’s
data overall and ultimately save money.9 Despite these somewhat recent
pronouncements, the majority of attorneys are not appropriately using
encryption.10 A 2019 ABA Cybersecurity Survey showed 26% of the survey
respondents’ law firms experienced some type of data breach. 11 Further, the
survey results suggest, “less than half of respondents use file encryption (44%),
slightly more than a third use email encryption (38%), and even fewer use
whole/full disk encryption (22%).”12 There was a slight increase in the use of
encryption by law firms from 2018 to 2019,13 however these numbers still remain
too low.
State bars are now starting to require technology and/or cybersecurity CLE
in furtherance of the ABA rules, with North Carolina and Florida requiring one
or more hours in technology CLE and New York in 2020 moving toward
required CLE in the area of cybersecurity specifically.14 These factors evidence
the need for attorneys to learn about encryption and related tech as this is highly
relevant to protecting data in the attorney’s care or in the context of the attorney
advising clients on data protection strategies for client held data. Examples of
legal issues requiring use of encryption and other technology concepts include
compliance with security requirements of GLBA & HIPAA, encryption safe
8
Id. (stating, “Even if a company scrupulously follows the requirements of the
jurisdiction in which personal data is collected, and provides appropriate notices of the use of
the information, and the rights of the individuals who provide the information, unless the
information is appropriately protected in transit, during processing, and at rest, the entities
who collect or hold such personal data may be liable for significant liabilities and penalties”).
It is therefore critical that lawyers not only generally understand encryption and how it should
be used, but also how to appropriately protect data in transit, during processing, as well as at
rest to avoid liability.
9
Id. at 1-2.
10 John G. Loughnane, 2019 Cybersecurity, 2019 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. TECH. REP. (Oct. 16,
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/techreport/abatech
report2019/cybersecurity2019/.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Bob Ambrogi, North Carolina Becomes Second State to Mandate Technology Training for
Lawyers, LAWSITES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/12/north-carolinabeco mes-second-state-mandate-technology-training-lawyers.html; Brian G. Cesaratto &
Shawndra G. Jones, New York Could Become the First State to Require Cybersecurity, EPSTEIN
BECKER
GREEN
WORKFORCE
BULLETIN
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.workforcebulletin.com/2020/09/03 /new-york-could-become-the-first-stateto-require-cybersecurity-cle/.
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harbors relative to state data breach notification laws and the CCPA, the NYDFS
Cybersecurity Regulation, and PCI standards.15 In addition, a lack of encryption
can support a negligence claim.16 Also, encryption can be one useful mechanism
to protect an organization’s trade secrets or other sensitive business data.
Attorneys and technologists will continue to work together on assessment of
technology relative to cybersecurity and privacy issues, digital forensics in
litigation, etc. Accordingly, knowledge of encryption and the environment in
which it operates should help attorneys bridge communication gaps with
technologists. Regarding privacy, encryption is potentially the principal tool to
increase privacy, so such knowledge should likely benefit attorneys in assessing
the effectiveness of encryption technologies in terms of improving privacy.17
For example, some policy discussions have taken place in 2020 regarding
encrypted DNS over HTTPS.18 Lawyers would certainly seem to benefit from a
better understanding of relevant encryption concepts to assess the effectiveness
of emerging encryption technologies, such as encrypted DNS.
2. Caveat: Encryption Promotes Privacy but is not a Privacy Panacea
Use of encryption technologies is typically not a guarantee of privacy. For
example, as explained in section C below, the HTTPS protocol encrypts the
payload of data packets but does not hide the identity of the sender and receiver
(e.g., perhaps like a phone record revealing dialed and received phone numbers
without access to the contents of conversations). Also, DNS leaks and browser
fingerprinting are described below, which may negate a user’s intended
anonymous browsing when using a VPN service. Accordingly, attorneys are
better positioned to assess privacy effectiveness of new or existing encryption
technologies by having a basic understanding of encryption concepts and the
context in which encryption is implemented in order to understand the pros and
potential shortcomings of various encryption technologies.

15 PCI stands for Payment Card Industry standards, which constitute a private
agreement between merchants and credit card issuers, requiring encryption and other
protections for credit card information. See PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2020).
16 In collecting and storing employees’ data on its computer systems, UPMC owed
employees a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against an unreasonable risk of
harm arising out of that act. Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1047 (Pa. 2018).
17 See Lauren C. Williams, Edward Snowden Says Encryption Is the Only Way to Counter Mass
Surveillance,
THINK
PROGRESS
(Mar.
10,
2014,
6:57
PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/edward-snowden-says-encryption-is-the-only-way-tocounter-mass-surveillance-ee450433dca8/ (noting Snowden’s comment that “[e]ncryption is
the defense against the dark arts for the digital realm.”).
18 See infra Section II.E.
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II. A MOSTLY TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF ENCRYPTION CONCEPTS
A. EXPLORING ENCRYPTION, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY CONCEPTS, AT
REST

In my prior work, I described that a 30,000-foot-high view of tech
educational instruction is essentially worthless to attorneys, while a 10,000-foothigh view provides meaningful depth to understand the tech that relates to the
legal issues (and 0 foot/in the weeds is overkill for those not doing IT work).19
I also discussed the importance of visual aids to understand IT concepts. Below,
I attempt to provide a 10,000-foot level of education relative to encryption and
its contexts, embedding a variety of visual aids to enhance understanding. 20
1. Encryption Generally
To begin the encryption discussion, I first describe what encryption is, its
application to stored data, and some methods used to crack/decrypt data. Later,
I discuss general networking protocols for transmitting data as context followed
by different implementations of encryption.
Encryption is essentially the conversion of plain text to a meaningless string
of gibberish (called cipher text) so that an eavesdropper cannot easily decipher
it.21 For context, the earliest known form of encryption is likely the Julius Caesar
Cipher, which Caesar used to send military messages. The Caesar Cipher works
by using an algorithm, such as shifting every character once to the next letter in
the alphabet (or probably a much more complicated algorithm that would be
harder to crack, such as shifting the first letter of each word twice, shifting the
second letter of each word four times, etc.).22 A simple example of a Caesar
Cipher is to shift each letter once.23 Therefore, the word “Hello” becomes
“Ifmmp.” Obviously, an eavesdropper would have to spend at least minimal
effort to decrypt “Ifmmp” to the word “Hello.”
Modern computers can very easily and quickly crack a Caesar Cipher, so a
more sophisticated key/cipher is needed than mere letter substitution. A variety
of modern encryption standards have replaced obsolete standards, and currently

19 Volini, Anthony, A PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION FOR
LAW STUDENTS, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 165, 173 (2020),
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol36/iss2/2.
20 I created most of the diagrams herein using draw.io, a free tool available on the
Google Chrome browser.
21
See Encryption, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption (last visited
Dec. 2, 2019) (discussing encryption generally).
22 Caesar Cipher, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY, http://practicalcryptography.com/ciphe
rs/caesar-cipher/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
23 Id.
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used standards may likely remain strong enough for several years.24 The
strengthening of encryption standards can be observed by organizations
periodically increasing the length of an encryption key (e.g., from 40 to 56 to 128
bit to 256 bit) to make the encrypted data less vulnerable to brute-force attack
(brute-force attack and encryption complexity are discussed in greater detail
below). Encryption standards must be improved every few years given Moore’s
law; Moore’s law is an empirical observation that computer processing power
roughly doubles every two years.25 Therefore, according to Moore’s law, a
computer’s power and speed to decrypt encrypted data increases substantially
every two years. Consistent with Moore’s law, a variety of past encryption
standards have been replaced with stronger encryption algorithms. 26
2. Local Encryption
A defensive use of encryption for Wyndham would have been to encrypt all
stored personal data, such that the data could only be decrypted and used by
Wyndham with a password (i.e., the password essentially operating as the
decryption key).27 Data stored on Wyndham’s servers, whether local on-site
servers or remote leased servers in the cloud (such as third-party Amazon Web
Service servers), thus should have been encrypted.
To further understand local encryption, one can consider a personal laptop.
In a laptop running Microsoft (MS) Windows, a consumer can adjust his settings
to turn on local encryption. The effect of turning on local encryption is that all
stored data on the laptop is turned into unintelligible gibberish when it is logged
off or powered off. When the consumer logs back into his laptop, using his
password, the password essentially acts as the decryption key that decrypts the
gibberish (e.g., MS Word documents) back into “plain text” (also referred to as
“clear text”). If a forensics professional or bad actor encounters a powered
off/logged off laptop, he may attempt to physically plug into the hard drive to
24 See Cryptography Standards, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography
_standards (last updated June 5, 2020 2:31 PM) (noting various encryption standards that are
now obsolete).
25 Shara Tibken, Moore’s Law is dead, says Nvidia’s CEO, CNET (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:46 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/moores-law-is-dead-nvidias-ceo-jensen-huang-says-at-ces2019. Nvidia CEO (an industry leader in graphics processing units) Jensen Huang has
reported on multiple occasions, “. . . as the scale of chip components gets closer and closer to
that of individual atoms, it’s gotten harder to keep up the pace of Moore’s Law. It’s now more
expensive and more technically difficult to double . . . the processing power for a given chip
every two years.”
26 See 40-bit encryption, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/40-bit_encryption
(last updated Oct. 28, 2019, 3:25 PM) (describing both 40 and 56 bit encryption key lengths as
obsolete and replaced by key lengths of 128 bit or longer).
27 Chris Hoffman, Why a Windows Password Isn’t Enough to Protect Your Data, HOW-TOGEEK (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:02 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/161444/htg-explains-why-awindows-password-doesnt-protect-your-data/.
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extract the data. If the laptop does not have local encryption turned on, then the
forensics professional will easily see all of the data in unencrypted form (without
the need to log in).28 With a running logged-on laptop, the local encryption
setting is irrelevant: a forensics professional (or a bad actor) physically or
remotely accessing the laptop can easily see all the data in unencrypted form,
since local encryption occurs upon logging off/powering off.
3. Local Encryption and Password Protection are not Necessarily the Same
It is important to note that password protection and local encryption are not
necessarily the same thing. For example, if a computer has local encryption
turned off, a password may be used to log on to the computer (e.g., access a
Windows environment) but no local encryption occurs when logging off. As
noted above, with local encryption turned off, a forensics professional or bad
actor can physically plug into the computer’s hard drive and retrieve all data even
though he does not have the password that provides access to the user’s
computer by authenticating with the computer’s operating system. Hence,
plugging into the computer’s hard drive effectively bypasses the operating
system’s password gate. In simple terms, the operating system’s password gate
is like a padlock on a storage locker. An intruder can gain access to the storage
locker without going through the padlocked front door (perhaps by unscrewing
a back panel of the storage locker). And when access is successful, the files and
items in that storage locker are freely accessible – despite the padlock on its front
door. Thus, turning on local encryption can be viewed as additional protection
(in addition to the password/padlock), perhaps conceptualized as keeping one’s
data within a locked box inside of the padlocked storage locker.
4. Local Encryption of Thumb Drives
In addition to turning on local encryption on a laptop or PC, thumb drives
containing sensitive information can also be locked/encrypted with a password.
As an example, Microsoft’s Bitlocker tool can be used for this purpose and is
included with most versions of Windows 10.29 Certainly, an attorney may
encrypt a thumb drive containing sensitive client information to facilitate
compliance with ABA Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
(confidentiality).30

28 See Penny Hoelscher, How to encrypt Files and folders in Windows 10, 8 or 7,
COMPARITECH (June 5, 2018), https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/encrypt-wi
ndows-files/, for a general discussion about implementing local encryption on Microsoft
Windows files and folders.
29 Overview of BitLocker Device Encryption in Windows 10, MICROSOFT (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/informationprotection/bitlocker/bitlocker-device-encryption-overview-windows-10.
30 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2020).
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5. Encryption of Data Held by a Cloud Provider
Organizations are increasingly storing data in the cloud, with a cloud provider
such as Amazon holding the data for them. An organization should insist on
having such stored data encrypted and should pay attention to which parties have
access to the relevant decryption keys for data (as well as other relevant
cybersecurity controls). 31 Another strategic decision may involve whether to
encrypt data before uploading it to a cloud provider’s platform or after.32
6. Encryption of Emails33
Lawyers and other professionals subject to a duty of confidentiality should
consider use of email software supporting encrypted communications, including
free software or software sold by a particular vendor.34 The failure to encrypt
sensitive emails can constitute an ethical violation. For example, in its Formal
Opinion 2010-179, the State Bar of California urges attorneys to encrypt email,
stating that it is a “reasonable step . . . when the circumstance calls for it,
particularly if the information at issue is highly sensitive and the use of encryption
is not onerous.”35
Various email platforms support encrypted communication, which lawyers
can consider when sending sensitive information to a client. For example, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation describes PGP as the standard open source
encryption software to install for encrypted emails.36 Various third-party
encryption services also exist, such as Virtru, which is advertised as capable of
integrating with Microsoft Outlook and Gmail.37 Besides the need for attorneys
to encrypt sensitive emails per ABA Rule 1.6 (duty of confidentiality), HIPAA

31 See Nate Lord, What is Cloud Encryption, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-cloud-encryption, for a general discussion about
cloud encryption and decryption keys.
32 Id.
33 See infra Part II (focusing primarily on encryption of data at rest. Certainly, after an
email is sent it is at rest (although encrypting emails also provides in transit protection from
eavesdroppers)).
34 Lori Kaufman, The Best Free Ways To Send Encrypted Email and Secure Messages, HOWTO-GEEK, https://www.howtogeek.com/135638/the-best-free-ways-to-send-encrypted-em
ail-and-secure-messages/ (last updated July 11, 2017, 8:56 PM); see Encryption in Transit in Google
Cloud, GOOGLE CLOUD, https://cloud.google.com/security/encryption-in-transit/ (last
updated Oct. 12, 2020) (discussing the encryption of data in transit in general).
35 Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2010-179 (3)(a)(ii) (2010) cited in 21 TORTSOURCE 3, 4,
21 NO. 3 TORTSOURCE 3, 4.
36 Communicating with Others, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, https://ssd.eff.org/en/mo
dule/communicating-others (last updated June 9, 2020).
37 Editorial Team, Why Email Encryption is Necessary for Lawyers, VIRTRU (June 5, 2020),
https://www.virtru.com/blog/law-firm-data-security/.
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and GLBA requirements regarding protection of sensitive health or financial
information would be furthered by email encryption.
Another benefit of the encryption of emails or using encryption email
services is encrypted email can potentially stop an email provider from scanning
email contents for targeted ad purposes.38 Services like Tutanota, Protonmail,
and Posteo, just to name a few, offer end-to-end encryption which minimizes
the extent to which emails can be scanned, which ultimately eliminates targeted
ads resulting from scanned emails.39
7. Encrypted/Password-Protected Documents Attached to Emails
Professionals sending sensitive information can consider sending password
protected documents, so the recipient needs the appropriate password to decrypt
and view the contents. Password protection can be readily applied to PDF
documents, MS Word documents, and other files.40 Encrypting email
attachments can thus serve as a way to encrypt sensitive information if the
attorney and client do not have an email encryption mechanism in place to
encrypt contents of the entire email message itself. In such a scenario, the
attorney may share the password with the client by telephone or other means.
8. Brute-Force Attack of Encrypted Data (e.g. passwords or numeric passcode on a
smartphone)
A brute-force attack can involve trying every possible key upon the data directly
until the data is decrypted (i.e., until the plain text is revealed).41 Alternatively, a
brute-force attack can involve trying every possible password to gain access to a
computer. For simplicity, this section focuses on the brute-force attack of a
password. Assuming data on a hard drive is locally encrypted, a password must
be entered to cause the hard drive’s data to be decrypted so that it can be accessed
by programs and users. Therefore, the forensics professional or a bad actor may
attempt a “brute-force attack” to crack a password and thereby decrypt the data.
A brute-force attack involves attempting every possible combination of
38 Editorial Team, Do I Need Email Encryption Software?, VIRTRU (Sept. 5, 2020),
https://www.virtru.com/blog/email-encryption-software/ (noting both the government and
your email provider may have access to your email communications and service providers
frequently harvest users emails to show ads, but encryption software can protect both your
individual messages and from normalizing surveillance methods).
39 Michael Grothaus, These 4 Gmail alternatives put your privacy first, FASTCOMPANY (Aug.
21, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90392612/these-4-gmail-alternatives-put-your-pri
vacy-first.
40 Chris Hoffman, How to Password Protect Files and Folders With Encryption, HOW-TOGEEK (July 30, 2016 11:59 AM), https://www.howtogeek.com/170352/how-to-passwordprotect-files-and-folders-with-encryption/.
41 Brute-Force Attack, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute-force_attack
(last updated Feb. 13, 2021 at 2:22 PM).
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characters until the password is successfully cracked, allowing the forensics
professional to log in. As a highly simplified example, consider a four-integer
password to unlock a smartphone: X X X X. Each integer X could have a value
between 0 and 9 (i.e., 10 possible values). Therefore, the password has 10^4
possible number combinations (i.e., 10,000 possible combinations). A bruteforce attack would involve trying every number combination until arriving at the
correct password.
In contrast to a numeric smartphone passcode, with an unknown laptop
password the length of the password could vary. The password complexity is
potentially far greater given that the laptop owner could use a variety of letters,
numbers, and special characters in the password. 42
9. Courts Compelling a Defendant to Provide a Password or Biometric
Should the government’s attempt to forensically crack a password prove
impractical, the government may seek a court order compelling a defendant to
disclose his password.43 Some courts may view this as a Fifth Amendment
violation, essentially viewing this as compelled self-incriminating testimony.44
(As a side note, courts typically view compelled production of a physical
42 See Password must meet complexity requirements, MICROSOFT (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policysettings/password-must-meet-complexity-requirements, for a 2017 general discussion of
Microsoft’s complexity requirements.
43 For example, forensic crime labs may have smartphones or other devices subjected
to brute force encryption for many months without success. See Appleinsider Staff, APPLE
INSIDER,
https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/04/17/researcher-estimates-graykey-canunlock-a-6-digit-iphone-passcode-in-11-hours-heres-how-to-protect-yourself (last visited
Oct. 14, 2020) (describing how some phone passcodes can be cracked in mere hours while
longer passcodes may take years to successfully brute force).
44 See generally State v. Andrews, 457 N.J. Super. 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018),
aff’d, 243 N.J. 447, 234 A.3d 1254 (2020) (finding compelled production of passcodes did not
violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination under the “foregone
conclusion” exception to privilege). But see Pollard v. State, 287 So.3d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2019), reh’g denied (Dec. 23, 2019), cert. dismissed, No. SC20-110, 2020 WL 1491793 (Fla. Mar.
25, 2020) (explaining that the state’s generalized requests for multiple categories of
communications, pictures, and social media activity did not describe contents of defendant’s
cellphone with particularity, as required to compel production of defendant’s cellphone
password under the foregone conclusion exception to the Fifth Amendment). See also, e.g.,
United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding compelled
disclosure of defendant’s password would violate the Fifth Amendment: “In this case, the
government is not seeking documents or objects—it is seeking testimony from the Defendant,
requiring him to divulge through his mental processes his password—that will be used to
incriminate him.”). Cf. State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“requiring
defendant to produce passcode did not compel defendant to communicate information that
had testimonial significance.”). See Fern L. Kletter, Construction and Application of “Foregone
Conclusion” Exception to the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d
Art. 10 (2017), for further discussion of cases on either side of this issue.
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biometric, such as a fingerprint, as non-testimonial, and thus, not Fifth
Amendment prohibited.)45 Therefore, if a cell phone can be unlocked by both a
fingerprint and a passcode, presentation of a fingerprint to unlock the cell phone
could often be compelled, but disclosure of the passcode to unlock the cell
phone could not be compelled in some jurisdictions. Other courts may view
compelled production of a password as not Fifth Amendment prohibited,
however, relying on the foregone conclusion doctrine to justify the compelled
production: for example, the compelled production seems to fit this doctrine if
the government knows the existence, possession, and authenticity of the
incriminating evidence because the production involves no testimonial
attribute.46
10. Strategies to Inhibit Brute-Force Decryption or Other Attacks on Passwords
a. Avoid Easily Guessed Passwords
Wyndham’s servers had easily guessed passwords, which supported liability
under the FTC Act. While the dominant focus of this article is on encryption
concepts, discussion of password concepts is merited in this article because, as
noted above, passwords are often essentially used as a trigger to encrypt/decrypt
data.
An example of an easily guessed password on a server or other computer
could be “admin” used as both the username and the password. Historically,
manufacturers of servers, routers, and other infrastructure have provided default
passwords for their products, which one can locate with a quick web search. 47
For example, a particular model of server could have “admin” as the default
username and “cisco” as the password.48
Historically, network administrators (and software developers) did not think
about security upfront. Instead, the goal was to get the network up and running
perhaps with the view that they could always go back and change the
manufacturer’s password later (and never do that). In recent years, particularly

45
At the time of writing, courts have split on whether the compelled use of biometric
authentication is permissible under the Fifth Amendment. E.g., United States v. Wright, 431
F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1186-87 (D. Nev. 2020). Compare Matter of White Google Pixel 3 XL
Cellphone in a Black Incipio Case, 398 F. Supp. 3d 785 (D. Idaho 2019) (finding that
compelled use of a fingerprint to unlock a cellphone was not testimonial) with Wright, 431 F.
Supp. 3d at 1187.
46 Wright, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1186-87 (finding that an officer holding a defendant’s
phone to their face in order to unlock the device was a violation of the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights).
47 See Default Passwords, DATARECOVERY.COM (June 23, 2014), https://datarecovery
.com/rd/default-passwords/ (listing passwords for different devices and applications).
48 Tim Fisher, Cisco Default Password List, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/ciscodefault-password-list-2619151 (last updated Oct. 1, 2020).
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with the enactment of Europe’s GDPR in 2018, implementing security by design
and by default is the new norm to comply with regulatory requirements or at
least to reduce legal exposure (and US organizations and legislators have been
influenced by GDPR concepts). 49 Article 25 of the GDPR requires security by
design and by default for parties launching a new IT product or service.50
Therefore, GDPR compliance would require a network administrator to think
about security upfront and change any default passwords immediately when
designing and setting up a network for the first time. Obviously, security by
design should be implemented with a U.S. organization’s systems to reduce
exposure regarding the FTC Act or other laws, including GPDR if EU personal
data is at issue.
b. Implement Sufficient Password Complexity
In addition to easily guessed passwords, password complexity is another topic
of discussion in the security world. Various sources describe preferred minimum
lengths of passwords to reduce the risk of an attacker guessing the password or
cracking the password via a brute-force attack (discussed above) or a dictionary
attack (discussed below). Microsoft recommends a password length of at least
eight characters, refraining from using common passwords, and registering for
multi-factor authentication (discussed in the next section).51 Other sources
recommend using a long phrase to achieve a high level of complexity.52
Thanks to the Wyndham case and other similar decisions, hotel chains and
other organizations commonly have a password complexity requirement, which
employees or other users must comply with to set up a password for network
access.

49 See Lisa R. Lifshitz, United States: Security by Design: California’s New IoT Security Laws,
MONDAQ
(Nov.
22,
2018),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/security/757388/security-by-design-california39snew-iot-security-laws (explaining California has a law requiring security by design when
launching IoT devices).
50 Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (LI 19) [GDPR] at Art. 25, available at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.119.01.0001.01.
ENG.
51 Password policy recommendations, MICROSOFT (Oct. 13, 2020), https://docs.microsoft
.com/en-us/microsoft-365/admin/misc/password-policy-recommendations?view=o365worldwide.
52 See Oregon FBI Tech Tuesday: Building a Digital Defense with Passwords, FBI (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/portland/news/press-releases/oregon-fbitech-tuesday-building-a-digital-defense-with-passwords (noting “extra length of a passphrase
makes it harder to crack”).
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c. Adopt Two-Factor/Multi-Factor Authentication
As of this writing, two-factor authentication is essentially becoming the norm
for protecting sensitive data. For example, when a consumer attempts to log in
to his online bank account from a new device (or from a new IP address not
used previously), the banking site will typically text (or email) a one-time
password to the consumer’s phone. This way, a bad actor would need not only
the consumer’s username and password, but also his smartphone (or access to
his email) to gain access to the consumer’s online bank account. Regarding
Wyndham, an organization could have password protection on its servers, and
require two-factor authentication for remote access to organizational servers.53
d. Implement Non-Obvious Usernames
Many computing systems require a combination of a valid username and a
valid password to provide access to the user attempting to access it. Frequently,
a valid username is easy to guess. For example, a bad actor can notice that an
organization’s
email
accounts
follow
the
standard
FirstInitial+LastName@Domain.com and that the organization’s domain
usernames perhaps follow the standard LastName+FirstInitial. Consequently, a
bad actor can reliably construct valid usernames — and leave his brute-forcing
efforts to guess only that user’s password to impermissibly gain access to his
email account or laptop. Therefore, implementing non-obvious usernames can,
at the very least, increase a bad actor’s burden to brute-force his way to access
an
account.
For
example,
the
username
standard
LastName+FirstInitial+4DigitNumber both lengthens the username and makes
it less obvious to guess to make a brute-force discovery of the username more
difficult. Thus, while John Miller’s domain username might ordinarily be MillerJ,
the username might become MillerJ8264. This username is non-obvious and
longer than MillerJ, and it may be less likely to be guessed by brute-force
attempts. Of course, many organizations might resist such username complexity
as it may be inconvenient for users to remember a more complex username.
e. Implement Automatic Account Disabling After Several Failed Login Attempts
Brute-forcing access to a system requires a bad actor try a series of passwords
(and potentially usernames) until they find a successful combination, as discussed
above. Implementing automatic account disabling whereby the account is
automatically disabled (or all data wiped/erased) after a reasonable number of
login attempts helps thwart brute-force attempts to access a computer system.
(As an interesting side note, it’s conceivable that attackers could use easily-

53 See Multi-Factor Authentication, ATLANTIC.NET, https://www.atlantic.net/multifactor-authentication/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020 2:59 PM) (noting multifactor authentication
as “one of the best ways to protect against remote attacks”).
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discovered usernames to trigger automatic disabling of accounts, thereby causing
a form of denial of service attack.54)
f. Provide Secure Password-Protected WiFi that Adheres to a Reasonably Strong
Encryption Standard
It seems that there is decreasing prevalence of consumers and businesses
setting up open Wi-Fi networks that have no password or encryption protection.
An open network with no password protection/encryption could easily allow a
bad actor to park his car near the Wi-Fi network and sniff the airwaves for
unencrypted traffic. As of this writing, the most advanced Wi-Fi encryption
standard is WPA3, but WPA2 may continue to be implemented for several years
before becoming obsolete.55 It’s conceivable that someone could foolishly
choose an obsolete (and thus vulnerable) encryption standard, perhaps out of a
list of drop-down encryption options, when configuring a Wi-Fi router (e.g.,
selecting the obsolete WEP standard).56
11. Encryption Key Length
As noted above, organizations tend to increase the length of encryption keys
every few years (e.g., from 40 bit many years ago to 128 bit to 256 bit to larger
values) to make encrypted data less vulnerable to brute-force attack.57
To illustrate how increasing the key length decreases brute-force attack
vulnerability, I provide a highly vulnerable and impractical but simple example.
First, consider a two-bit encryption key. A bit can have a value of 1 or 0.
Therefore, consider a two-bit key XX where X can have a value of 1 or 0. A two
bit key therefore has four possible values: 00, 01, 10, and 11 (alternatively
expressed as 2^2 possible combinations). Therefore, an attacker who knows
there are only four possible keys would try each one until successfully guessing
the correct key, thereby decrypting the data. As explained above, in a brute-force
attack, the attacker tries all possible two-bit keys (all four of them) until he
successfully decrypts the string of cipher gibberish into the original clear text
data. A computer could very easily attempt all four decryption keys, so this twobit key provides almost no security.

54 See Understanding Denial of Service Attacks, CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY AGENCY (Nov. 4, 2009), https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015 (discussing
denial of service attack).
55 See Rahal Gupta, What’s the Difference Between WPA3 and WPA2 What’s WPA3 Exactly,
GUIDING TECH (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.guidingtech.com/wpa3-vs-wpa2/ (noting
WPA3 implementation beginning in 2018).
56 See WEP vs WPA Encryption, NETGEAR, https://kb.netgear.com/20043/WEP-vs-W
PA-Encryption (last updated Nov. 28, 2016) (noting that the “Wi-Fi alliance highly
recommends against using WEP and plans to make it obsolete.”).
57 40-bit encryption, supra note 26.
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A key’s complexity in this example could be increased exponentially by
adding additional characters. For example, a five-character key XXXXX, where
X equals 1 or 0, would have 2^5 possible combinations (i.e., 32 possible
combinations). Using a realistic modern example, a 128-bit key has 2^128 (or
3.4 * 10^38 possible key values), which in theory could take many years to break.
Encryption can be conceptualized as a multiplication process where the original
data is multiplied by the key to encrypt and divided by the key to decrypt.
Therefore, a brute-force attack can be conceptualized as dividing the encrypted
data by every possible key value until successfully decrypting the data to plain
text.
As of this writing, organizations have implemented symmetric encryption
keys of 128-bit length or greater (for symmetric keys). Given Moore’s law,
encryption key lengths are likely to increase over time. It should be noted that
where encrypted data is encrypted with a 128-bit key, it would be much easier to
crack a short password (e.g., several characters in length) to decrypt the data
rather than attempting to brute force-decrypt the data directly.58 Put another
way, attempting all possible passwords for a password several characters long is
likely much faster than applying 2^128 possible keys directly against the data
(especially if one employs a dictionary attack on the password as described
below).
12. A Dictionary Attack as a Faster Alternative to Brute-Force Attack
As a faster alternative to a brute-force attack, the forensics professional
may employ a “dictionary attack.”59 This works by collecting a dictionary of
commonly used passwords (obtained from the internet) and trying those
common passwords first in an effort to quickly crack the password. 60 A web
search of common password cracking tools reveals many software programs,
such as “John the Ripper” (JTR) and “Cain and Abel,” which are used by
forensics professionals and others to crack passwords. 61
58 Why brute-force the password instead of the key directly?, STACK EXCHANGE,
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/167868/why-brute-force-the-passwordinstead-of-the-key-directly (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
59 See Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 997
(2018) (describing a “guess the key” encryption workaround). A guess the key strategy might
involve law enforcement quite literally guessing a suspect’s key and manually entering a few
guesses. However, a dictionary attack is a more automated species of guess the key where an
entire file of commonly used passwords is attempted by an automated program. An automated
dictionary attack is described on page 999 of this article without using the term dictionary
attack.
60 Dictionary
Attack,
TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1774/dictionary-attack (last updated Oct. 21, 2011).
61 Howard Poston, 10 Most Popular Password Cracking Tools, INFOSEC (Sept. 25, 2020),
https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/10-popular-password-cracking-tools/ (noting John
the Ripper as popular tool and referencing Cain and Abel as a topic in this organization’s
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Returning to the smartphone example, a forensics professional could locate
a dictionary of common integers used in four-digit passcodes. For example, one
might locate a list, starting with the most common four-digit passcodes to the
least common four-digit passcodes (in descending order from #1 to #10,000).62
A dictionary attack would involve starting with the most commonly used
passcodes first (i.e., the most common is 1234 and the second most common is
1111) in an effort to more quickly crack the passcode than mechanically iterating
through 0000, 0001, 0002, 0003, etc. until reaching 9999.
A dictionary attack of a password on a laptop or PC follows similar principles.
Human behavior, including password selection, can be fairly predictable.
Therefore, certain passwords are commonly used on a laptop just as humans
have common integer passcodes on a 4- or 6-digit smartphone passcode. With
a dictionary attack, a forensic examiner locates a file containing thousands of
hacked passwords (i.e., a dictionary of common passwords) from prior data
breaches and then applies those passwords first. For example, “password,”
“monkey,” and “superman,” are often observed as within the top twenty-five
most commonly used passwords. 63 Therefore, a dictionary attack works by
attempting these and hundreds of other commonly used passwords first in an
attempt to more quickly crack the laptop’s password in comparison to trying
every random combination of alphanumeric characters.
13. Using Encryption as an Attack Mechanism
While the discussion thus far has focused on encryption of stored data as a
defensive measure by the data owner or the computer owner to protect
information from a bad actor, it should be briefly noted that encryption can be
used offensively in a ransomware attack to attack stored data. In a ransomware
attack, the attacker locks the victim’s data via encryption and promises to decrypt
the data upon payment of a ransom. 64 One might naively believe that
maintaining data backups will prevent or mitigate a ransomware attack. For
example, an organization maintaining a weekly backup might operate on the
premise that following a ransomware attack, it could revert back to the backup,

training course). See also United States v. Martin, 2019 WL 5098748, at *1 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
2019) (describing the usage of a “Greykey” program used to unlock password-protected
electronic devices, such as smartphones).
62 Akemi Iwaya, The Most Common and Least Used 4 Digit Pin Numbers [Security Analysis
Report], HOW-TO GEEK (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:30 AM), https://www.howtogeek.
com/125378/the-most-common-and-least-used-4-digit-pin-numbers-security-analysisreport/.
63 List
of
the
most
common
passwords,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_most_common_passwords (last updated Oct. 15,
2020, 10:12 AM).
64 Ransomware,
CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY,
https://www.us-cert.gov/Ransomware (last visited Oct. 14, 2020, 3:15 PM).
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forego paying the ransom, and lose up to a week of data in lieu of paying the
ransom. However, some attacks may target data backups.65 Therefore, there are
several questions to explore. One is whether backups can be sufficiently secured
on the local network or on a cloud provider’s network. Also, an organization
could consider air-gapping, a physical backup stored off the network for sensitive
information.66 Perhaps the most common attack vector for ransomware or other
attacks is through email phishing,67 so employee security awareness training and
marking outside emails as “external” are common security measures in a robust,
layered security program.
As a side note, ransomware attacks may involve a threat of data exfiltration.
For example, an attacker may first extort a victim to decrypt the data. Then, the
attacker may extort a second sum from a victim with the threat of publishing the
data to others. If an organization has its data securely encrypted, and the attacker
is unable to decrypt it, this would reduce the threat of data exfiltration as stolen
gibberish is not a target for publication.
B. UNDERSTANDING HASHING VS ENCRYPTION OF STORED DATA

As a starting point, encrypting data changes its form, and the encrypted data
is convertible back to its original form by decrypting it. However, a hash value
of data generally cannot be converted back to the original data. Hashing is thus
loosely analogous to generating a word count of a document. A word count of,
say, 10,256 is not readily convertible back to the original text. Put another way,
if I gave a person the value of 10,256 words and asked her to recreate my original
document, it would be essentially impossible to do without more information.
That being said, the value 10,256 words could be used as a tool to distinguish
that document from other documents on my computer. This is the essence of

65 David Bisson, Ransomware Attacks Targeting Organizations’ Backup Storage, SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE
(Dec.
9,
2019,
12:30
PM),
https://securityintelligence.com/news/ransomware-attacks-targeting-organizations-backupdata-storage/; see also Maria Korolov, How to Protect Backups from Ransomware, CSO (Jan. 14,
2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3331981/how-to-protect-backupsfrom-ransomware.html; Rod Matthews, Ransomware Will Target Backups: 4 Ways to Protect Your
Data,
DARKREADING
(Oct.
4,
2017,
10:30
AM),
https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/ransomware-will-target-backups-4-ways-toprotect-your-data/a/d-id/1330029.
66 Air gap (networking), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_%28
networking%29 (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
67 See
Glossary,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
STANDARDS
AND
TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/itl/smallbusinesscyber/cybersecurity-basics/glossary, (last updated
Feb. 28, 2019) (defining “Phishing” as: “A technique for attempting to acquire sensitive data,
such as bank account numbers, or access to a larger computerized system through a fraudulent
solicitation in email or on a web site. The perpetrator typically masquerades as a legitimate
business or reputable person.”).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

314

6/2/2021 11:58 PM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 28:2

hashing—it is a value that can be used to identify or represent the data, such as
a file, hard drive, or password, but it does not reveal the data itself.
1. Saving Stored Encrypted Passwords vs. Saving Hash Values of Passwords
Storing a hash value of a password can be considered more secure than
storing encrypted passwords in a database because the hash value is not readily
convertible back to the original data. In addition, “salting” a password (as
described below) prior to hashing can further improve security by making it even
more difficult to ascertain a password from the hash value. For example, in In re
LinkedIn Privacy Litigation, LinkedIn responded to a data breach of actual
subscriber passwords, releasing a statement on its blog that it had switched its
password encryption method from a system that stored member passwords in a
hashed format to one that used both salted and hashed passwords for increased
security.68
Generating a hash value of data (i.e., hashing) can be thought of as a
cryptologic cousin of encrypting data. However, as discussed, a major difference
between encrypting data and hashing data is that a hash value generally cannot
be used to reconstruct the original data, while an encryption key can be used to
encrypt or decrypt data. The below section describes the difference between
encryption and hashing and then further discusses relevant hashing principles.
2. Conventional Encryption/Decryption is Generally a Two-Way Reversible Process
(unlike hashing)
Conventional encryption (also called “symmetric” encryption) can be
visualized as a reversible process as seen in FIG. 1 below, where the same key
can be used to either encrypt or decrypt the data. (The sender and receiver use
the same key to encrypt or decrypt.)
Figure 1

68

In re LinkedIn, 2014 No. 5:12-cv-03088-EJD, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014).
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3. Generating a Hash Value of Data is Generally a One-Way Function
While encryption is a reversible process, generating a hash value is not.
Instead, generating a hash value can be described as a one-way function. To
illustrate the concept of hashing, I provide a fictitious example. Assume a
hashing algorithm creates a hash value that simply counts the number of
characters in a word (see FIG. 2A below).

Figure 2A
User

Original Data
(password)

Hash Value
Algorithm = number of
characters

user1

hello

5

user2

Hello

5

user3

major

5

user4

hi

2

In light of the key hashing principle that the original data cannot be readily
reconstructed from the hash value, one generally cannot reverse engineer the
words “Hello” or “major” from the hash value “5”. For example, if a hacker
gained access to a database of stored hash values, he could not reconstruct the
original password “hello” armed only with a hash value of “5”, because there are
many words (or random letter strings) that are five characters in length.
However, a major flaw with my fictitious hashing algorithm is that a hacker
could create a random password of five characters in length that would gain
access to the system for many users having five character passwords. For
example, if a hacker accesses a database of stored hash values for each user, he
will observe that user1 has a hash value of “5”. He could enter the username
user1 and any password five characters in length (e.g., 12345) to access the
system. The system would calculate a hash value of the password, “5”, based on
his entered password (12345) and determine that this hash value matches user1,
and therefore grant access (assuming two-factor authentication is not in place).
Expanding on this problem, the above hashing algorithm needs to produce
unique hash values. My conceptual hashing algorithm is defective because three
identical hash values (i.e., 5) are created for different data inputs. Therefore, a
better hashing algorithm is needed to avoid a hashing “collision” where two
identical hash values are generated for different data inputs.
Real-world hashing algorithms include the MD5 and SHA1 hashing
algorithms, and these algorithms generally have sufficient mathematical
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complexity to avoid hash value collisions for different data inputs. Either of
these algorithms can be used to generate a hash value of some data input (e.g., a
file to be hashed, an entire hard drive to be hashed, or some smaller data input
such as a password).

Figure 2B: MD5 Hash Values for Particular Data Inputs

Original Data

Hashing algorithm

Hash value generated

Hello

MD5

8b1a9953c4611296a827abf8c
47804d7

major

MD5

aa6df57fb6fe377d80b4a257b
4a92cba

hello

MD5

5d41402abc4b2a76b9719d91
1017c592

Hello there my
friends. It’s great
to see everyone.

MD5

272638daff573f18183dab457
0bd3bc0

As seen in FIG.2B, applying an MD5 hash value to “Hello” and to “major”
generates a unique MD5 hash value for each original data input. 69 The MD5
hash value is thus superior to my conceptual hashing algorithm in FIG. 2A
because there is no hash value collision, meaning that the generated hash values
are unique for different data inputs. Also, the MD5 hash value changes
dramatically for even a minor change in the data input. For example, a lowercase
“h” in the word “hello” results in a very different hash value than upper case
“H” for the data input “Hello.”
Another feature of a hashing algorithm is that the generated hash value has a
fixed length irrespective of the size of the data to be hashed. For example, the
MD5 algorithm is designed to generate a 32-character hash value, as seen in the
above table, regardless of the size of the data hashed. Therefore, a unique 32character hash value is generated whether the data input is the word Hello or the
data input is all of the text of a novel, such as War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy. This
can be seen in the bottom row where the relatively long phrase “Hello there my
friends . . .” generates a 32-character MD5 hash value despite being a larger data
input than the first three rows. Further, the MD5 hashing algorithm, like any
69 These hash values were generated using an online hash generator. Dan’s Tools, MD5
Hash Generator, https://www.md5hashgenerator.com/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
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other hashing algorithm, is designed so that the original data cannot be readily
reconstructed from the hash value: generally speaking, just like a word count of
a document is not convertible back to the text, a hash value does not convert
back to the original data.
4. How are Hash Values Used?
Two common purposes of hash values are data fingerprinting in the forensics
context or protection of stored passwords.
a. Digital Fingerprinting
Regarding data fingerprinting, a file such as a photo or other file has a hash
value generated for that file. For example, the federal government maintains a
database of hash values for known child pornography images; Google and other
search engines generate hash values for images on their systems, and if any hash
value matches a value of known child pornography image, law enforcement may
be alerted, and the image is likely taken down.70 File fingerprinting can likewise
be used to determine whether a plaintiff’s stolen file or other data is present on
a defendant’s computer. A forensics professional can prepare a hash table of all
files on a defendant’s computer and then look for any hash values that match the
plaintiff’s hash value of interest.
Fingerprinting is also used in digital forensics as a chain of custody tool. 71
For example, the government or a plaintiff in a civil suit may have a forensics
professional take a digital image (i.e., make a copy) of a defendant’s hard drive
(or a relevant portion thereof). At the time of collection, the forensics
professional typically makes multiple copies and records an MD5 or other hash
value of the copied hard drive. If the defendant were to later allege that certain
hard drive evidence was fabricated or falsified, the forensics professional can
provide a copy of the hard drive to the defendant having an MD5 hash value
that matches the hash value at the time of collection. The plaintiff or
government can then invite the defendant to retrieve the same evidence from
that hard drive copy. Because any minor change in data dramatically alters the
MD5 hash value, the matching hash value serves as strong evidence that the hard
drive’s data was not changed post-collection.

70 See United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Private businesses and
police investigators rely regularly on ‘hash values’ to fight the online distribution of child
pornography.”).
71 See United States v. Bout, 651 Fed. Appx. 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (where defendant tried
to assert defects in the chain of custody, including failure to run a hash value comparison
between the mirrored drive and the original, arguing therefore that the forensic copy of the
hard drive and all exhibits that relied upon its data should have been excluded from evidence
as improperly authenticated).
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b. Hashing Stored Passwords
As noted above, it’s a common practice to store hash values of passwords
(e.g., customer passwords) in a database rather than the actual passwords. 72 This
way, if a hacker is able to extract password information from a database, it
consists of hash value representations of the passwords that are generally not
usable to reconstruct the actual passwords. However, in a rainbow attack,
discussed below, a hacker or forensics professional might successfully decipher
actual passwords from hash values.
In usage, a customer may log in to a website using his password. The website
may apply a hashing algorithm to the customer’s inputted password to generate
a hash value. Then, if that hash value matches the stored hash value for that
customer’s username, the customer is authenticated and granted access to the
system. In addition to the obvious benefit that the plaintext versions of the
passwords are not available for theft, this also creates a double-blind
environment wherein only the user knows the password; the service only has the
hash stored (as opposed to the actual password) available to it.
Regarding hashing algorithms, it should be noted that the MD5 hashing
algorithm is not sufficiently secure73 from a cryptologic standpoint for storing
hash values of passwords because the MD5 algorithm is vulnerable to a rainbow
attack, (discussed below) which can potentially reconstruct original passwords
from their hash values. However, the MD5 hashing algorithm may be
considered suitable for data fingerprinting purposes.74
5. Salting a Hash Value to Inhibit Rainbow Attacks of Hashed Passwords
In 2012, Linkedin suffered a data breach of over six million passwords. 75
Although hashed values of the passwords were stored, these values were

72 See In re LinkedIn, 2014 No. 5:12-cv-03088-EJD, at *1 (noting usage of storing salted
hash values for user passwords).
73 As of this writing, SHA2 (of varying key lengths) hashing algorithms are considered
more secure than MD5. See Patrick Nohe, Rehashed: The Difference Between SHA-1, SHA-2, and
SHA-256 Hash Algorithms, HASHEDOUT (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.thesslstore
.com/blog/difference-sha-1-sha-2-sha-256-hash-algorithms/; SHA-1, WIKIPEDIA (Oct. 10,
2020, 7:48 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1#Attacks; 3 Reasons Why MD5 is not
Secure, MD5, https://www.md5online.org/blog/why-md5-is-not-safe/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2020).
74 For example, cases within the last few years describe forensics professionals using
MD5 hash values for fingerprinting purposes. See, e.g., Campbell Alliance Group, Inc. v.
Dandekar, 2014 WL 145037, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing the process of a forensic
examiner collecting an MD5 hash value when making a copy (i.e., forensic image) of a party’s
hard drive).
75 Brid-Aine Parnell, LinkedIn admits site hack, adds pinch of salt to passwords, THE REGISTER
(June
7,
2012,
10:03
AM),
https://www.theregister.com/2012/06/07/linkedin_admits_data_breach/.
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vulnerable to attack because they were not “salted.”76 Salting a hash value is a
further encryption step to inhibit rainbow attacks of hash values. 77 A rainbow
attack involves generating a rainbow table, which can be simplistically thought
of as a table of hash values corresponding to particular passwords. 78 While this
is not entirely accurate (the math is much more complicated), this is conceptually
what the attack involves. To create a salted hash value, an organization can
concatenate (i.e., combine) a random string (i.e., a salt) with a consumer’s
password and then apply the hashing algorithm to the combined salt + password
as seen below.79
Figure 2C

Username

Password

user1

password123

user2

password123

Username

Salt
Value

String to be hashed

Hashed value= SHA256
(password + hash
value)

user1

E1F53. . .

password123E1F53. . .

72AE25495A7981C40622
D49F9A52 . . .

user 2

84Bo3. . .

password12384Bo3. . .

B4B6603ABC670967E99
C7E7F1389. . .

Id.
Salt (cryptography), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography)
(last updated Aug. 26, 2020, 7:29 AM). See In re LinkedIn, No.: 5:12–CV–03088–EJD, 2014
WL 1323713, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal.) (2014) (“‘[S]alting’ is an encryption process that protects
information by concatenating a plaintext password with a series of randomly generated
characters prior to hashing.”).
78 For a description of a rainbow table, see Rainbow Table, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainbow_table (last updated Feb. 16, 2021, 8:40 PM).
79 The table is copied from Wikipedia, but the various salt values, string to be hashed,
and hashed value are shortened/truncated for ease of illustration. Salt (cryptography),
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography) (last updated Aug. 26, 2020,
7:29 AM).
76
77
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The principle here is that the attacker would need to know the salt value and
then use this value in constructing a rainbow table to determine actual passwords.
The salt is therefore an additional barrier to a rainbow attack. An organization
could increase resistance to rainbow attacks by increasing the length of the salt
string, using different salt values for different users, and other methods.
C. DATA IN TRANSIT: UNDERSTANDING CORE NETWORKING PROTOCOLS AS
CONTEXT FOR UNDERSTANDING ENCRYPTION OF DATA IN TRANSIT

Protecting stored data with encryption is a worthwhile goal, but encrypting
data in transit is another helpful protection measure. The following discusses
general concepts relative to common data transmission concepts (i.e., data in
transit).
Understanding the difference between data in transit and data at rest can be
helpful from a legal standpoint, such as courts assessing the application of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, for
data in transit for wiretap orders and application of the Stored Communications
Act (SCA) 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 for stored data.80 At least one court has
generally addressed the concept of data at rest versus data in motion in the
context of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010.81 When considering whether law enforcement should
have a front door to encrypted data (the debate outlined in Part 3), it is helpful
to understand the difference between an ephemeral symmetric key for
encryption/decryption of data transmitted during a single browsing session and
a longer-life key for stored data.82
1. How Data is Transmitted: Data Packets
As a first general point (as noted in In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation and
as noted previously), computers communicate by exchanging information
packets.83 Typically, a large file is split into multiple packets to facilitate
transmission, and the packets are reassembled at the receiving end. Each packet
has a header and a payload. The header can be thought of as an envelope or a
label with “to” and “from” information (source computer IP address and
destination computer IP address). The payload is the data. Packets can be
80 See David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy and Law Enforcement in the Cloud, 49 CONN L.
REV. 1657, 1668-1669 (2017) (discussing the legislative history and applicability of the ECPA
and the SCA); see also, In re Yahoo Mail Litigation, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(discussing application of the ECPA to data in transit and the SCA to stored data).
81 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This
Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 355-363 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
82 See Opderbeck, supra note 80, at 1667 (discussing sessions keys being discarded in
ephemeral communications).
83 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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classified as either “connectionless” or “connection-oriented” as described in
detail below. Data is sent in data packets across the internet and into local
networks because files are often too large to be transmitted in a single stream of
bits. For example, an ethernet cable can only transmit roughly 1500 bytes in an
ethernet frame, so a large file greater than 1500 bytes in size must typically be
split up into data packets and then reassembled at the receiving computer. 84
When teaching law students about data packets, which consist of an IP header
and data, it is helpful to provide a 10,000-foot view of data packets rather than
teaching all details. For example, the following data packet has too much detail:

A Data Packet with Too Many Details

Testing law students on all details of the above data packet is likely overkill.
It is certainly acceptable to display and discuss briefly, but extensive teaching and
testing of all data packet components seem more suitable for IT students. 85 A
more simplified view of a data packet is shown below and is likely more
appropriate as a context for understanding the IT concept generally.86

84
See
Maximum
Transmission
unit,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_transmission_unit (last updated Sept. 26, 2020,
4:35 PM), for a discussion of maximum transmission unit and reference to ethernet frame.
85 See Network packet, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_packet (last
updated Sept. 22, 2020, 12:19 PM), for a general discussion of data packet components.
86 All details of a data packet are omitted as this would result in a 0 foot/in the weeds level
of detail more appropriate for an IT professional. A more complete view of a data packet may
be viewed at Michael Mullins, Exploring the anatomy of a data packet, TECHREPUBLIC (July 2, 2001,
12:00 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/exploring-the-anatomy-of-a-data-packet
/.
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A Simplified Data Packet
HEADER
Source
IP
address

Destina
tion
IP
address

Source
Port

Destinat
ion
Port

DATA/
PAYLOAD
Protocol
or other
technical
details

here is a recipe for
the perfect
margarita. . .

As discussed above, the header can generally be thought of as an envelope,
and the data payload can be thought of as a letter within the envelope. Much
like a physical envelope needing sender and recipient street address, a data packet
needs both a sender address (source IP address) and a recipient (destination IP
address). Standard data transmission protocols are discussed below, starting with
protocols that do not use encryption to understand better sending encrypted data
mechanisms.
2. Common Encryptionless Protocols Involved in Data Exchange: IP, UDP & HTTP
Several primitive networking protocols are briefly introduced here for
context and expanded upon in later sections; none of them use encryption.
As a first general point, a “protocol” is essentially an agreed-upon procedure
for how two computers will communicate.87 A lawyer could thus view a protocol
as a contract between two computers, such as agreeing on a mechanism for
uniquely identifying each computer (i.e., the internet protocol discussed below)
or an agreement as to further technical steps for sending and receiving an email
(e.g., SMTP: simple mail transfer protocol). When transmitting data, two
computers will typically rely on multiple protocols to transfer data according to
a particular process (e.g., a computer communicating with a web server or two
computers exchanging emails). For example, the TCP and UDP protocols
discussed below rely on the Internet protocol (IP) as an underlying protocol (e.g.,
perhaps viewing IP as a first agreement upon which to build further agreements).
Various protocols used by computers have been developed in large part by
the Internet Engineering Task Force, which publishes protocols via RFCs
(Requests for Comments). 88 Having such protocols or standards in place is
critical for computers to interact. Otherwise, an Apple computer might not

87 Protocol, TECHOPEDIA (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4528
/protocol.
88 RFCs, IETF, https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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communicate appropriately with a Dell computer if it operated according to its
protocols rather than common protocols.
Perhaps the most important protocol is the Internet Protocol (IP), which
requires each internet-connected computer to utilize a common addressing
scheme.89 IP is thus the foundation of the internet. An IP Address is an internet
subscriber’s unique identifier for browsing the web. Much like a driver’s license
number for surfing the web, the IP Address is a series of digits (such as
78.192.192.244) that identifies the user’s computer to make connections with
other computers.90 To illustrate the need for a standardized form of unique IP
addresses, imagine if computer users named their internet-connected computers
by first and last name. The problem with this approach is that users with
common names, such as John Smith, would be unable to uniquely identify their
computers, and web servers and other computers would end up sending data to
the wrong John Smith.
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) lease unique IP addresses/identifiers for
home internet connections, and these leased IP addresses may remain the same
for many years.91 This background on IP addresses is relevant to privacy because
an IP address can be used to identify an individual and his browsing history and
other data. In fact, in copyright BitTorrent cases, groups of John Doe
defendants have been initially listed by their IP address (where plaintiff’s attempt
to later discover each defendant’s actual identity entailed issuing a subpoena to
an ISP to disclose name and address associated with that ISP subscriber’s IP
address).92
Regarding data packet transmission, a sending computer could choose to
send either a UDP (User Datagram Protocol) packet or a TCP (Transmission
Control Protocol) packet. UDP, as explained below, is a “connectionless”
protocol, which might be described as “send it and hope it gets there” (because
the receiving computer sends no confirmation of receipt or notice of failed
delivery), while TCP is connection-oriented such that the two computers
confirm that each data packet was successfully received.

Internet Protocol, INFO. SCIENCES INST. (Sept. 1981), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc791.
Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Static vs. Dynamic IP Addresses, AVAST (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.avast.com/c-static-vs-dynamic-ip-addresses.
91 For example, observe that while “many homes . . . have theoretically dynamic IP’s, [they
tend to hold] the same IP for multiple years.” How Long Does an IP Address Stay Attached to a
Home or Business?, ELTORO, https://www.eltoro.com/how-long-does-an-ip-address-stayattached-to-a-home-or-business/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
92 For general discussion, see Eric Goldman, Strike 3’s Copyright Litigation Campaign Completely
Strikes
Out,
TECHN.
&
MKTG.
LAW
BLOG
(Nov.
2,
2019),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/11/strike-3s-copyright-litigation-campaigncompletely-strikes-out.htm.
89
90
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3. UDP is Like Sending a Postcard and Hoping it Gets There
A very simple and common protocol for sending data packets is UDP. It is
a simple, no frills “connectionless” protocol for simple, fast, unencrypted data
transmission.93 It is similar to mailing a postcard (because the postal carrier, and
any eavesdropper, can easily see the sender and receiver’s identities and the
message (i.e., the data payload)). Physical postal analogies, while imperfect, are
helpful to understand relevant IT concepts and are used in various sections
below.94
UDP is considered “connectionless” because the sender does not receive
automated notice of whether packets failed to successfully arrive. This can be
compared to mailing a postcard and not caring or checking whether it
successfully arrives. For example, imagine mailing a postcard from a vacation
spot and not sticking around for any return to sender notice; the sender simply
hopes it arrives.
Figure 3 below conceptually depicts a UDP Packet.

Figure 3

93 J. Postel, User Datagram Protocol, INFO. SCIENCES INST. (Aug. 28, 1980), https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/rfc768.txt.
94 See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (noting
“[a]n analogy to physical space, while inevitably imperfect when analyzing the digital
world, may be helpful.”).
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4. TCP, a Component of HTTP/HTTPS, is Somewhat Like Using Certified Mail
(and Carefully Tracking Notification of any Failed Delivery)
Another very common protocol introduced above is TCP, characteristically
used for both HTTP and HTTPS transmissions.95 TCP is different from UDP
in that TCP is “connection-oriented” and thus “reliable.” This means that the
sender and receiver have error checking, checking whether all data packets have
been received and not lost or corrupted in transmission. As explained more fully
later, TCP is helpful to ensure accurate receipt of all data packets, such as an
attorney sending a file to a client without lost, missing, or altered words (even
after that large file has been split up into multiple packets and reassembled at the
receiving end).96
5. HTTP, which Integrates TCP, is thus like Sending a Postcard via Certified Mail
(and Carefully Tracking Notification of any Failed Delivery).
HTTP has historically been a very common protocol for web browsing (i.e.,
exchanging data between a user’s computer and a web server computer). 97
HTTP data exchange typically occurs over TCP. Therefore, sending an
HTTP/TCP data packet is like sending a postcard via certified mail (and looking
out for delivery problems). In the HTTP/TCP packet, the sender, receiver, and
data are visible to an internet eavesdropper (just like a UDP packet), but the
sender and receiver have the reliable (connection-oriented) TCP connection,
which notifies the sender of any lost or corrupted data packets, so that he may
resend.
As an analogy, suppose someone wishes to send a long message split into two
certified postcards and wants to confirm that each postcard arrived to the desired
sender. Assume he can use certified mail for the postcards, which alerts the
sender of successful or unsuccessful delivery, and which the sender carefully
tracks. He marks the first postcard “1 of 2” and the second postcard “2 of 2”
and sends them certified. The certified mail process will alert him to any delivery
problems, and he can expect to receive some alert if one of the packets (i.e.,
postcards) did not arrive. TCP is like this certified mail scenario. Unlike the
“connectionless” UDP, TCP is referred to as providing “reliable” (i.e.,
connection-oriented) delivery. As TCP’s name implies (transmission control
protocol) the transmission of data is controlled and monitored for delivery

95 Transmission Control Protocol, RFC, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc793 (last updated July
29, 2020) (discussing the mechanics of TCP).
96 Important Application Layer Protocols: DNS, FTP, SMTP, And MIME Protocols, SOFTWARE
TESTING HELP, https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/dns-ftp-smtp-mime-protocols/ (last
updated Sept. 13, 2020) (describing the MIME application layer protocol, which supports
email attachments, running over TCP).
97 Henrik Nielson, et al., Hypertext Transfer Protocol—HTTP/1.1, RFC, https://tools.
ietf.org/html/rfc2616 (last updated Jan. 21, 2020).
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problems. Both HTTP and its encrypted variant HTTPS use TCP’s reliable
delivery system, which causes lost or corrupted data packets to be resent. As
noted previously, multiple protocols may be involved in a particular type of data
transmission. The HTTP protocol is one good example of a protocol that
incorporates other protocols as it relies on both IP and TCP.
6. Modern Web Servers Tend to use HTTPS Rather than HTTP
Before discussing the details of HTTPS, I note that “HTTPS” protocol is
now the norm for web servers, replacing usage of the HTTP protocol. 98
Generally, the “S” of HTTPS stands for “secure” and requires an encrypted data
payload transmission between a host device (e.g., a consumer’s laptop) and a
website/web server and also requires authentication of the web server through a
digitally signed third-party certificate (discussed in more detail in section VII
below). This push for increased HTTPS usage was encouraged in part by a 2016
campaign by the Electronic Frontier Foundation to increase online privacy
protection.99
7. HTTPS over TCP is like Sending a Letter in an Envelope via Certified Mail and
Requiring the Recipient to Show ID for Receipt
To begin distinguishing HTTP from HTTPS, continued postal analogy may
be helpful. As discussed, HTTP is the internet equivalent of sending a postcard
(but with careful delivery tracking), because any internet eavesdropper can readily
see: who the card is from (source IP address); who the card is to (destination IP
address); and the contents of the postcard’s message (the data payload).
However, HTTPS adds encryption, encrypting the data as it is divided into
packets, such that the payload portion of each data packet is encrypted. One can
visualize writing a long letter, encrypting it, and then cutting it up into separate
pieces, with each piece having its own envelope to hide the data. At the receiving
end, the pieces are then reassembled in the proper order and decrypted.
Technically, the HTTPS protocol improves on HTTP by adding an encryption
layer, referred to as a transport security layer (TLS) on top of HTTP.
Transport security layer is a reference to the OSI model of computing, the
open system interconnection model, which is an abstract model to describe how
computers process information and communicate with each other. 100 The
transport layer of the OSI model is the layer describing two computers agreeing

98 Hypertext Transfer Protocol, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypertext_
Transfer_Protocol (last updated Oct. 12, 2020, 8:05 AM).
99 Encrypting the Web, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/
encrypt-the-web (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
100 OSI Model, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model (last updated Oct.
5, 2020, 6:16 AM).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss2/2

36

Volini: A Deep Dive into Technical Encryption Concepts to Better Understa
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TECHNICAL ENCRYPTION CONCEPTS

6/2/2021 11:58 PM

327

to communicate together, such as a laptop establishing a communication session
with a website/webserver.101
As alluded to above, the encryption of an HTTPS packet can thus be
visualized as an envelope that hides the payload, but the outside of the envelope
(i.e., the source and destination IP address) is visible to eavesdroppers. The
HTTPS protocol also includes authentication of the web server, via a website
certificate, as an initial step before exchanging encrypted data (this web certificate
authentication process is explained in section VII below). This could be
visualized as requiring the recipient of a certified letter to show identification for
receipt. HTTPS is therefore more secure than HTTP, because HTTPS
authenticates that data exchange is occurring with a legitimate web server.
Checking whether a website/web server is using HTTPS simply requires
examining the URL in the browser bar. For example, typing “depaul.edu” into
the browser bar triggers a visit to DePaul’s web server, and the browser bar
displays “https://www.depaul.edu/Pages/default.aspx.”
The HTTPS
connection ensures that the data payload transmitted between a user’s laptop and
DePaul’s web server is encrypted. This way, if an eavesdropper were to intercept
data packets between the two parties, he would see mostly encrypted gibberish
rather than clear text data. As an example of an eavesdropping attack, a bad
actor could visit DePaul’s campus and connect to its local Wi-Fi network. He
could then use a free program such as Wireshark to “sniff” (i.e., see) all traffic in
real-time on the local network.102 Any HTTP traffic from other users on the
network would be readily visible to the eavesdropper (just like postcards in plain
view). For this reason, as noted above, most sites will not allow HTTP
connections to their web servers to reduce the risk of having sensitive data visible
to such an eavesdropper (e.g., account information, user names, passwords).
Organizations using the HTTPS protocol for their web servers are essentially
reducing their legal exposure (e.g., negligence claims and potential regulatory
actions) by reducing eavesdropping attacks on their website visitors.
A visual of HTTPS communication is provided in Figure 4 below:

101 See Peter Swire, Privacy and Security A Pedagogic Cybersecurity Framework, VIEWPOINT (Oct.
2018), https://peterswire.net/wp-content/uploads/Pedagogic-cybersecurity-framework.pdf,
for a more detailed discussion of the OSI model as it relates to legal education; see Volini, supra
note 19 at 38-39, my article offering ideas related to Swire’s framework.
102 WIRESHARK, https://www.wireshark.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
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Figure 4 HTTPS Packets (Conceptual Illustration)

Figure 4 shows that the header information is visible (unencrypted), but the
data is encrypted. In this regard, the header information needs to remain
unencrypted so that routers on the internet know where to send the data packets.
Further, the return address is needed to facilitate responsive data packets.
Accordingly, using the HTTPS protocol encrypts the data from an internet
eavesdropper’s view, but cannot hide the identity (i.e., IP address) of the sender
and receiver from his prying eyes.
A summary of the foregoing protocols is provided in the table below:
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8. Further Context for Data in Transit: Granular Technical Steps Involved in Visiting
a Website
Knowing what goes on “behind the scenes” enhances understanding of
security and privacy concepts. When someone types a web address into the
browser on her laptop (e.g., CNN.com), her laptop first performs some form of
DNS (domain name service) query because the laptop needs an IP address to
connect with the CNN web server (CNN has several web servers to handle its
significant website traffic, and the IP address for one of those servers at the time
of this writing is 151.101.193.67).103 If CNN.com is one of her commonly visited
sites, her browser probably has the IP address saved in a temporary browser
memory (i.e., an unexpired DNS record is available in the temporary browser
cache).104 If the an unexpired IP address/DNS record of CNN.com is not in
the cache, however, her laptop needs to reach out to a DNS server. In her home
environment, this could be her ISP’s DNS server (or in her law school, it may be
the school’s local DNS server).
When establishing an HTTPS connection, the laptop connects to port 443 of
the CNN web server in order to establish a communication “session” between
the laptop and the web server. After the browser authenticates the legitimacy of
the web site via a third-party web certificate (see section VII below), the laptop
and web server essentially agree to use the HTTPS protocol for exchanging
encrypted data packets.
Once the laptop and web server agree to
communicate,105 the web server sends HTML and other commands to the user’s

103 In this regard, all internet connected computers must use the “Internet Protocol” (IP),
which requires all internet connected computers to use a common addressing scheme when
communicating with each other.
See What is the Internet Protocol?, CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/network-layer/internet-protocol/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2020) (discussing IP addresses and other aspects of the IP protocol); see Internet Protocol,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Protocol (last updated Oct. 12, 2020,
9:23 AM) (for additional general discussion).
104 If the Laptop is running a MS Windows operating system, then there is typically a
Windows DNS cache (in addition to a browser DNS cache), and the laptop can check the
Windows cache before having to query a DNS server. Bradley Mitchell, DNS Catching and
How It Makes Your Internet Better, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-dns-cache817514 (last updated May 1, 2020). DNS records in a cache expire frequently, having a TTL
(time-to-live), ranging anywhere from perhaps thirty seconds to 24 hours; this means that DNS
queries are still frequent even with DNS caches. TTL Best Practices: the Long and Short of It, DNS
MADE EASY (Aug. 18, 2017) https://social.dnsmadeeasy.com/blog/long-short-ttls/. As a
side note, items in temporary cache memory can be a helpful source of forensics information
in a legal proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2006)
(involving forensic analysis of cached web pages in connection with a child pornography
charge).
105 This process of agreeing to establish a session is referred to as a three-way handshake.
See, e.g., Explanation of the three-way handshake via TCP/IP, MICROSOFT (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/networking/three-wayhandshake-via-tcpip.
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laptop. These commands instruct the laptop what colors, text, and functional
features to display on the laptop’s screen.
Port 443 is one of the “well-known” ports in computing (ports 1-1023 are
referred to as well-known ports).106 One can think of a port like a channel on a
CB radio. For example, if one wishes to communicate with truck drivers, he
would select channel nineteen on the CB radio (or channel nine for emergency
usage).107 Similarly, a laptop can connect with Port 443 of a web server for an
HTTPS connection or Port 80 for an HTTP connection (as discussed, most sites
now prohibit Port 80/HTTP connections). 108
With CB radio communication both parties tune to the same channel (e.g.,
channel nineteen). With HTTPS connection, a user’s laptop connects to port
443 of the web server from a random ephemeral port of her laptop (the random
ephemeral port typically has a value within the range of 1025 to about 65,000 in
MS Windows operating systems). 109 The user’s laptop selects a specific random
ephemeral port (such as Port 22,123) to facilitate maintaining a specific port-toport connection between the user’s laptop and the web server during their
browsing session. In this example, port 22,123 can be useful to distinguish two
computers on the same network that are both visiting CNN.com from the same
public IP address.
For a more in-depth discussion, I provide a detailed half hour video lecture
on my YouTube channel of the above steps relative to a computer visiting a
website.110 This is one of the first week’s lecture videos in my online Data
Privacy Law course at DePaul University.111
D. VPNS CAN ENCRYPT BOTH THE HEADER AND THE PAYLOAD OF DATA
PACKETS

Before discussing a virtual private network (VPN), it may be helpful to
discuss the simple concept of a private network. For example, two internal
106 List of TCP and UDP port numbers, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_TCP_and_UDP_port_numbers (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
107 CB Radios, Frequencies, & Channels, CB WORLD, https://www.wearecb.com/cb-radiofrequencies-channels.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
108 Likewise, a laptop could attempt to connect with port 22 of the web server to send
administrative commands to the web server via the secure shell protocol (the SSH protocol is
associated with port 22). As a side note, the organization’s firewall should block such an
attempted port 22 connection and only allow such administrative connections from an
authorized IP address.
109 See Ephemeral port, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ephemeral_port (last
updated Sept. 9, 2020) (discussing random ephemeral ports generally).
110 Cybersecurity Patent Professor, How the internet works, YOUTUBE (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://youtu.be/UESJCDX40Wk.
111 I teach Data Privacy Law: US & EU, which surveys US and European privacy law, and
about 25-30% of the course content is relevant technology education.
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phones or computers in a home or business that never connect to the outside
world could be considered a private network. A VPN is considered “virtual”
because it creates a private network connected over essentially public internet
infrastructure. A VPN creates privacy virtually by using encryption to hide data
as it travels through public space. A VPN allows a sender of data to hide not
only the data in the data packets, but also the sender’s identity and potentially the
ultimate receiver’s identity. A VPN can essentially function as a messenger who
carries the data packet in a hidden manner across the internet. A VPN typically
improves on HTTPS transmission from a privacy standpoint because HTTPS
will encrypt the data payload of a data packet, but not encrypt the source and
destination IP address (see the unencrypted header in FIG. 4 above). 112
Before further technical discussion, it’s important to note that not all VPN
services are created equal and some will essentially sell the VPN user’s data (e.g.,
sites visited) to third parties, thereby defeating the whole purpose of using the
VPN service to anonymously browse the web. 113 In addition, some VPN service
providers maintain logs of their users’ internet activity — thus defeating the
purpose of using the VPN service to anonymously browse the web if these logs
are discoverable. A computer user may wish to hide his IP address via VPN for
legitimate defensive purposes or to hide criminal activity. 114 A consumer can
accomplish this typically by using a VPN service, which typically provides proxy
service.115 Another option, often used by organizations, is to utilize what is called
a site-to-site VPN (see FIG. 6 below), to encrypt data packets exchanged
between two locations (e.g., between two corporate networks).

112 Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Static vs. Dynamic IP Addresses, AVAST (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.avast.com/c-static-vs-dynamic-ip-addresses.
113 See Rob Mardisalu, How FREE VPNs Sell Your Data, THEBEST VPN (May 3, 2018),
https://thebestvpn.com/how-free-vpns-sell-your-data/ (noting that free VPN services in
particular are prone to sell the user’s data to third-parties).
114
Steve Symanovich, What is a VPN?, NORTON (Jan. 14, 2021)
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-privacy-what-is-a-vpn.html.
115 For example, suppose that Bob wishes to view sumo wrestling on WatchSumo.com
but does not want anyone to know that he is a sumo fan. He may sign up with BadAssVPN
(https://www.badass.sx/product/badass-vpn-service-prepaid/) to use their proxy service.
See BadAss, Sx. VPN service, BADASS.SX, (https://www.badass.sx/product/badass-vpnservice-prepaid/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
Instead of logging in directly to
WatchSumo.com, he connects to BadAssVPN, which then forwards his login packet to
WatchSumo.com. A traffic analyzer can see the packets between him and BadAssVPN.
Another traffic analyzer (or perhaps the same one) can see the traffic between BadAssVPN
and WatchSumo.com. Because the data is encrypted, no one can readily match Bob’s packets
to the ones between BadAssVPN and WatchSumo.com. However, it should be noted that if
only a handful of people are connected to BadAssVPN at the time, the timestamps of the
packets can be used to prove that Bob is using BadAssVPN as a proxy to connect to
WatchSumo.com. This precise situation has occurred when a user was using TOR (The Onion
Router) but only a few people were connected, thereby permitting law enforcement to catch
him.
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1. Using a VPN is like Hiding the Sender’s Letter Within an Intermediary
Messenger’s Envelope
Continuing with postal analogies, using a VPN is typically like sending a letter
inside of an envelope and then placing that envelope inside a messenger’s larger
envelope. This way, an eavesdropper can only see the messenger as the sender.
Also, all of the data is hidden by the messenger’s large envelope. The messenger
(i.e., VPN device or service) is referred to as a “proxy.”
To illustrate the analogy of sending US mail through an intermediary,
consider FIG. 5 below. Suppose Bob in Chicago wishes to send a letter to Alice
in New York, but he doesn’t want the U.S. Postal Service to know he is
communicating with Alice. Bob creates an envelope with Bob as the sender and
Alice as the recipient. He then places his letter into his envelope. Next, Bob
asks Vinnie the VPN service to mail the letter to Alice. Vinnie creates his own
larger envelope, labelling the sender as Vinnie and the recipient as Veronica, his
New York associate. Vinnie then places Bob’s letter inside this larger envelope
and drops it at the post office. All the post office officials can see is the envelope
from Vinnie to Veronica, and it cannot see Bob’s envelope inside nor the letter
to Alice inside Bob’s envelope. In IT terminology, this process of essentially
placing an original envelope within a larger envelope is referred to as
“encapsulation,” shown conceptually in FIG. 5 below.

Figure 5 Physical Envelope Analogy to VPN

A VPN service essentially provides this functionality of hiding the original
sender and ultimate receiver. The VPN service is the intermediary (Vinnie)
which handles sending the message, and the message is sent through the internet
rather than the U.S. postal network. Rather than hiding the original sender, the
ultimate receiver, and the data with physical envelopes, the VPN service encrypts
this information within its own larger data packet. The larger data packet shows
a source IP address owned by the VPN, so eavesdroppers on the internet only
see the VPN’s source IP address. Further, with the VPN site-to-site arrangement
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shown in FIG. 6 below, an eavesdropper would see another VPN’s address as
the destination IP address rather than Alice’s address.
To illustrate VPN concepts in a more direct sense, the following Figure 6
shows a site-to-site VPN.

Figure 6

In FIG. 6, the goal is to send a data packet from Station 100 on the left to
Station 200 on the right. Station 100 wants to hide that the message comes from
Station 100 and also wants to hide that the destination is Station 200. This goal
is accomplished by sending the data packet through VPN routers R1 and R2.
The original data packet on the far left has two key components: data (shown in
blue) and source and destination IP address (from Station 100 to Station 200)
shown in red.
VPN router R1 encrypts the entire data packet, encrypting both the data and
the source and destination IP address. R1 then “encapsulates” the original data
packet by adding its own IP header (shown above as “From R1 to R2”).116 This
encapsulation step is essentially the IT equivalent of placing an original envelope
from Bob to Alice within a larger envelope labeled from R1 to R2. The
communication between R1 and R2 is often described as traveling through an
“encryption tunnel,” and this phrase provides a good visual for the concept of a
VPN protecting data packets from eavesdroppers.
2. Consumer Usage of a VPN Service to Encrypt Header and Data Payload of Packets
The above corporate site-to-site VPN discussion involved two VPN devices
(one proxy VPN device for each end or endpoint of the communication).
However, a consumer typically signs up for a free or paid VPN service with the
116 This VPN scenario demonstrates an example of “encapsulation,” a fundamental
concept in computer networking. In a VPN context, the sender’s and receiver’s IP addresses
are encapsulated within the source and destination IP addresses of perhaps two VPN routers.
See generally admin, What is Encapsulation in computer networking?, COMPUTER NETWORKING
DEMYSTIFIED (July 12, 2013), http://computernetworkingsimplified.in/category1/layering/encapsulation-decapsulation/ (describing encapsulation generally).
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primary goal of hiding data packets from her ISP, perhaps rather than ensuring
complete encryption along the entire path between sender and receiver.117 As
discussed, using a VPN service could be for legitimate or illegal purposes. 118 For
example, in the 2019 Capitol One breach, the defendant, charged under the
CFAA, used a VPN service as an obfuscation technique (i.e., a hiding technique)
to make it difficult or impossible for others to identify her actual IP address in
connection with her hacking activity. Despite the use of this obfuscation
technique, her hacking activity was nonetheless traced back to her by the
comments she made on social media, bragging about her exploit.119

Figure 7: A VPN Service

FIG. 7 above conceptually shows a consumer connecting to a website
through a VPN service. The idea here is that the ISP, such as AT&T or Comcast,
only sees the consumer connecting to the VPN. The VPN then acts as an
intermediary between the laptop and the website (the VPN service acting as a
proxy to send and receive traffic to/from the website). To use the VPN service,
the consumer downloads software from the VPN service, and the software
allows the consumer to encrypt data packets between her laptop and the
destination website.
When the laptop is using the VPN service, the ISP may see data packets that
conceptually look as follows:

117 How to Really Hide Your IP address with a VPN-2021, VPNMENTOR (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.vpnmentor.com/blog/how-to-really-hide-your-ip-address-with-a-vpn/.
118 See Adam Marshall, The best VPN service 2021, TECHRADAR (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.techradar.com/vpn/best-vpn (giving examples of various VPN services and
describing VPN usage as a tool for privacy to keep one’s online life “anonymous from prying
eyes”).
119 Capital One Data Theft Impacts 106M People, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 30, 2019),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/07/capital-one-data-theft-impacts-106m-people/.
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As noted previously, an individual can use a VPN service for legitimate or
illicit purposes. For example, a consumer may use a VPN service to inhibit
eavesdropping attacks when connecting to her banking website.120 Some
organizations, however, will block known VPN IP addresses, which would
prevent legitimate users or bad actors from visiting the site through a VPN. 121
In another example, a bad actor may wish to use a VPN service to hide the fact
(from his ISP) that he is visiting a child pornography site or a site facilitating
illegal downloads of copyrighted movies.
3. Possible Privacy Shortcomings of VPNs
a. Subpoena Resistance by VPN Service and/or Absence of Records
One issue arising in civil and criminal litigation, noted above, is whether the
VPN service will honor a subpoena. Some do provide information, while other
overseas VPN services will not respond to a subpoena. 122 In the latter
circumstance, a civil plaintiff or the government may need other evidence to
prove the defendant visited some illicit site, such as through seizure of the
defendant’s computer for evidence of browsing history. Another issue with
VPNs is that some VPN providers market themselves as not maintaining
customer logs of their browsing activity, attracting users in search of this high
level of privacy.123

120 Eric Geier, Protecting Against Wi-Fi Eavesdropping, TECHGENIX (July 10, 2012),
http://techgenix.com/protecting-against-wi-fi-eavesdropping/.
121 Patrick Marshall, Why do some banks not allow for me to log on through a secure VPN?, SEATTLE
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/whydo-some-banks-not-allow-me-to-log-on-through-a-secure-vpn/.
122 And, in some circumstances a particular VPN service might not maintain any logs of
customer browsing activity helpful to law enforcement. Ray Walsh, 10 best no log VPNs to use
in
2021
|
Zero-logs
and
no
tracking,
PROPRIVACY,
https://proprivacy.com/vpn/comparison/best-no-logs-vpns (last updated Jan. 08, 2021);
Nick Pearson, Can Commercial VPNs Really Protect Your Privacy?, TECHDIRECT (Apr. 3, 2013,
11:54 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130402/02421422545/can-commercialvpns-really-protect-your-privacy.shtml.
123
Paul
Bischoff,
Best
Logless
VPNs
in
2021,
COMPARITECH,
https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/best-logless-vpns/ (last updated Nov. 30,
2020).
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b. DNS Leaks
A first technical issue to assess with VPN usage is whether the VPN service
is susceptible to DNS leaks. DNS leaks may reveal the user’s browsing activity
to her ISP thereby defeating the privacy goal of using the VPN service to hide
browsing activity from the ISP.124 With a DNS leak, the user’s browser makes
direct DNS queries to the ISP’s DNS server rather than making such requests
through the VPN’s server.125 An example of a DNS leak might involve a user’s
computer directly asking the ISP for the IP address of stdwatch.com rather than
having the VPN proxy send the DNS request for this IP address: the effect is
that the ISP is now aware that the user visited a site concerning STDs.
c. Browser Fingerprinting
A second technical issue to assess is whether the government or other party
could use “browser fingerprinting” to reveal a user’s identity despite the usage of
a VPN.126 For a simple example, consider the following. Assume law
enforcement track a user’s VPN browsing activity (e.g., sites visited within a time
period). They then compare that VPN activity to the browsing activity of a
previously used public IP address (i.e., the IP address of a defendant’s home
internet). Law enforcement may statistically demonstrate a very high likelihood
that the same user performed both instances of browsing. The preceding two
technical issues, along with issues of whether a VPN service maintains logs or
honors subpoenas, demonstrate that the use of a VPN service may not guarantee
the privacy of a user’s browsing.
E. USING ENCRYPTION TO IMPROVE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF DNS

In recent years, security and privacy discussions have arisen over DNS,
including options to potentially improve the privacy of DNS queries.127 Before
assessing potential DNS improvements, attorneys would benefit from first
understanding traditional DNS and its privacy shortcomings.

124 DNS leak, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_leak (last updated Oct. 13,
2020, 7:32 PM); How to Test for a DNS Leak with Legitimate Results, THE ST. OF SECURITY (Mar.
15, 2018), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/featured/test-dns-leak-legitimateresults/.
125 DNS leak, supra note 124.
126 Jon Watson, How to protect yourself against invisible browser fingerprinting, COMPARITECH,
https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/what-is-browser-fingerprinting-how-toprotect-yourself/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2020).
127 Gareth Tyson & Tim Böttger, DNS-over-HTTPS: why the web’s latest privacy tech is causing
an outcry, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 29, 2019), https://theconversation.com/dns-over-httpswhy-the-webs-latest-privacy-tech-is-causing-an-outcry-125188.
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1. How does DNS Work Generally?
People often describe DNS as the phone book of the internet.128 For
example, recall from section IV a consumer visiting a website that she has not
recently visited. She types the domain name into her browser bar (e.g.,
CNN.com). If a temporary memory cache, such as her browser’s DNS cache,
does not store the IP address for CNN.com on her laptop, her laptop must
request the IP address from a DNS server (e.g., likely her ISP’s DNS server).
Just as one uses a person’s name to look up their number in a phone book, the
DNS server uses the name “CNN.com” to look up CNN’s numeric IP
address.129 The laptop then uses the IP address to visit the website (i.e., establish
a session with CNN’s web server).130
2. Understanding the DNS Hierarchical Structure
Usually, a user’s computer or DNS server caches the IP addresses of
commonly visited websites. These DNS servers are typically either an ISP’s DNS
server or a local DNS server, such as an enterprise server on a university’s
network. This caching of IP addresses helps to prevent bombarding the
internet’s hierarchical DNS system with traffic.
To understand at a high level how an uncached DNS query works, it seems
helpful to start with a hypothetical postal analogy as seen in Figure 8A below.

128 Tim Fisher, What is DNS (Domain Name System), LIFE WIRE (Nov. 27, 2019)
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-dns-domain-name-system-2625855.
129 Like asking Siri to call one’s mother, the phone is not dialing M-O-M. Your phone
instead uses the 9-digit number (i.e., the IP Address) associated with the name (i.e., domain
name) to connect you to the other phone; What is DNS?, AMAZON,
https://aws.amazon.com/route53/what-is-dns/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
130 See What is DNS?, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/route53/what-is-dns/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2020) (presenting DNS from Amazon Web Services).
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Figure 8A: A Hypothetical Hierarchical Postal Address Lookup Process

In Figure 8A, Alice wants the postal address for Bob’s Cycles. Assume there
is only one “Bob’s Cycles” in a fictitious worldwide business registration system.
The only information Alice has is “Bob’s Cycles” followed by a code CILUSA.
She queries the world postal authority for the address. The world postal
authority sees the USA portion of the postal code and tells her to check the USA
Postal HQ. The USA Postal HQ then directs her to Chicago Postal Records,
which sends her the address, 123 Main St. Chicago, IL.
DNS queries follow a somewhat analogous process, as seen in Figure 8B
below.

Figure 8B Hierarchical DNS Query
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In Figure 8B, assume Alice types bobscycles.com into her browser bar. Her
computer does not cache the IP address, so the computer asks the local DNS
server for the IP address. The DNS server, however, may also not know the IP
address. The local DNS server must then look for the address through a
hierarchical process starting with the root server. The root server observes the
“.com” in the domain name and points to the top-level domain DNS server for
.com. This in turn directs a query to DNS server X, which has the
bobscycles.com IP address of 151.1.1.1.131
3. Improving DNS Privacy with Encryption
Traditional DNS queries rely on UDP, and thus, are inherently not private:
recall that one can visualize a UDP message as a postcard, which is viewable by
the postal carrier and other prying eyes along the route (see FIG. 3 above). More
specifically, one can visualize the DNS query as a consumer with a home IP
address of say 50.1.1.1 sending a postcard to his ISP’s DNS server with the data
payload “what is the IP address for someembarrassingsite.com?” The
consumer’s ISP might be AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, etc. The ISP then has the
ability to easily aggregate this data. The ISP can then sell the data to a third-party
or use it to deliver targeted ads to the consumer (e.g., advertise embarrassing
product A on the ISP’s search engine or other ISP controlled sites).
Various privacy articles have discussed DNS over HTTPS (DoH) as a
possibility of improving privacy.132 For an attorney to offer meaningful
leadership in this privacy discussion, she would at least need a basic
understanding of traditional DNS, including the UDP protocol which traditional
DNS relies on, as well as the basic operation of the HTTPS protocol.
Fortunately, both the UDP and HTTPS protocols are discussed above, so the
discussion here of these basic concepts might not be overwhelming.
DoH attempts to solve the problem of an ISP easily viewing a consumer’s
visited sites by hiding the data payload (e.g., “what is the IP address for
someembarrasingsite.com?”) with HTTPS payload encryption. The goal is to
hide the DNS query from the ISP and from any other internet eavesdroppers.
The consumer can send encrypted DNS queries to a private DNS server rather
131 This process of the local DNS server checking each server can be accomplished in a
recursive or iterative manner.
See What is Recursive DNS?, CLOUDFLARE,
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/what-is-recursive-dns/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020)
(“[T]he client does a form of delegation in a recursive DNS query. It tells the DNS resolver,
‘Hey, I need the IP address for this domain, please hunt it down and don’t get back to me
until you have it.’ Meanwhile, in an iterative query, the client tells the DNS resolver, ‘Hey, I
need the IP address for this domain. Please let me know the address of the next DNS server
in the lookup process so I can look it up myself.’”).
132 See Tyson & Böttger, supra note 127 (generally discussing DoH mechanics and some
concerns raised by it).
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than the ISP’s DNS server. If the ISP or other eavesdropper looked at the
consumer’s DNS packet, all they will see is the header information (i.e., from:
consumer’s home IP address, to: the DNS server’s IP address) and the encrypted
payload.
A lawyer with a basic understanding of HTTPS packets would understand
that DoH does not provide perfect privacy regarding an ISP’s ability to
determine a consumer’s visited websites. In this regard, while the ISP will not
be able to see the requested website in the consumer’s DNS query, the ISP still
has the ability to see header information in the subsequent data packets when the
consumer actually visits the site (i.e., when visiting someembarrasingsite.com
after the DNS query). The result is that the ISP will need to do more work to
assess which sites a consumer is visiting by analyzing header info in data packets
between the consumer and various sites. This is conceivably more work than
printing out (or otherwise tracking) a listing of traditional unencrypted DNS
queries the consumer has made in a given time period.
Another interesting issue to next consider is whether the consumer’s privacy
with regard to DNS queries is still fully protected with the new DoH system.
Mozilla’s Firefox browser was the first browser to offer DoH by default.133
Certainly, the DoH feature makes it more difficult for third-parties, such as the
consumer’s ISP or other prying eyes, to easily build a list of visited sites.
However, a question arises of what Mozilla will do with this data now that it
stands in the shoes of where the ISP formerly was? For example, Mozilla is in a
position to decrypt the DNS queries and theoretically sell the consumer’s visited
website data (or alternatively sell targeted ads that Mozilla can deliver to the
consumer).
4. Side Note on DNS Attacks
As a side note on DNS security, a variety of DNS attacks are possible that
direct a user’s computer to a malicious website rather than the intended website
typed into the browser bar. For example, an attacker could infect the browser’s
DNS cache or infect a DNS server to cause the user’s computer to visit a
malicious site. In this scenario, typing CNN.com into the browser bar could
direct the browser to the malicious IP address rather than IP address for CNN’s
web server. In another scenario, a user’s computer could send DNS queries to
a bad actor’s computer that is an impostor of a legitimate DNS server.
Different encrypted DNS mechanisms can be used to mitigate DNS attacks
as discussed in later sections.

133 Yash Wate, What is DNS over HTTPS and how to enable it on all browsers?, TECHPP,
https://techpp.com/2020/07/21/dns-over-https-guide/ (last updated July 21, 2020).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss2/2

50

Volini: A Deep Dive into Technical Encryption Concepts to Better Understa
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TECHNICAL ENCRYPTION CONCEPTS

6/2/2021 11:58 PM

341

5. BGP Attacks: A Type of DNS Attack
In 2008, the Pakistani government shut down YouTube for several hours by
having its telecom authority announce to the internet that its location was the
destination for YouTube’s IP address space.134 This essentially created a black
hole where users around the globe attempting to connect to YouTube were
routed to defunct Pakistani servers. The Pakistani motivation behind advertising
this false route was to prevent local Pakistanis from viewing certain offensive
content at the time related to the Prophet Mohammed. 135 This was essentially a
BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) attack, discussed below.136
While DNS addresses the question of “where do I go” (i.e., what’s the
numeric IP address for a domain name?), BGP addresses the question of “how
do I get there”? Once a computer performs a DNS query for an IP address (say,
of some website), the system of routers constituting the internet must determine
where to send the data packets to reach the IP address. This can be loosely
analogized to a consumer writing an address on an envelope, and then a postal
worker, functioning like a router, has to determine how to get there using street
signs.
Routers on the internet share/broadcast routing information with each other
via the BGP protocol (e.g., Router X says “come to me for IP address range
150.1.1.1 to 150.1.1.255”), and routers trust each other’s information. Large
organizations, such as commercial ISPs and universities, “peer” with each other
essentially informing/broadcasting to each other of which IP addresses they are
able to send data packets to. These peering organizations are known as
autonomous systems (ASs), and they are registered through ARIN (the American
Registry for Internet Numbers).137 Peering is performed by each ASs having
specialized BGP peering routers which inform other ASs of which IP addresses
they can connect to. Thus, the internet can be viewed as a collection of ASs
worldwide connected by miles of fiberoptic cables that span the world’s oceans
and land masses.
The Pakistani YouTube shutdown referenced above was caused by ASs
trusting each other (i.e., their BGP routers trusting each other). This raises a
question of how to avoid this issue in the future. One mechanism could involve
organizations selecting specific ASs that they can trust and authenticating that
134 Declan McCullagh, How Pakistan knocked YouTube Offline (and how to make sure it never
happens again), CNET (Feb. 25, 2008, 4:28 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-pakistanknocked-youtube-offline-and-how-to-make-sure-it-never-happens-again/.
135 Protests: Pakistan PM Orders YouTube Shutdown, SKY NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2012, 2:53 PM) https://news.sky.com/story/protests-pakistan-pm-ordersyoutube-shutdown-10469856.
136 Yakov Rekhter, et al., A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), RFC 4271 (Jan. 2006),
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271.
137 Autonomous System Numbers, ARIN, https://www.arin.net/resources/guide/asn/ (last
visited Oct. 11, 2020).
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they are indeed communicating with the trusted AS. A trusted AS could be
authenticated with public key encryption (and untrusted ASs could be ignored).
The authentication process could work much like third-party certificates used
with the HTTPS protocol as discussed in connection with FIG. 12 below. In
addition, vendor products and services could be explored, such as Akamai’s
Prolexic solution designed to protect against BGP and other attacks.138
6. Further Background: Traditional DNS Relies on UDP for its Speed and Simplicity
UDP is a very simple, fast protocol for transmitting data. UDP may have
been chosen as the protocol for DNS queries to reduce traffic congestion on the
internet (given the high volume of DNS requests from so many computers
worldwide). Further, another potential advantage of traditional DNS using UDP
is that UDP does not require the overhead of establishing three-way handshakes;
thus a DNS server can potentially serve more computers’ IP address queries than
if it were burdened by TCP.139
For a small data packet, any speed difference between TCP and UDP is likely
negligible. However, speed differences may become more significant for large
data packets. UDP is faster than TCP for large data packets for two key
reasons.140 First, as discussed, UDP is a connectionless protocol and can be
thought of as “send the data and just hope it gets there.” In contrast, TCP (used
by HTTP/HTTPS) takes the time (perhaps a few milliseconds) to confirm with
the receiver that all data packets arrived and will resend any lost data packets.
Second, UDP does not authenticate the identity of the receiver. Thus,
HTTP’s/HTTP’s initial step of confirming the other party’s identity (with TCP)
can likewise add fractional seconds to the data transmission.
For these reasons, UDP has traditionally been a good option for sending live
video data packets.141 For example, resending live video data often makes no
sense. Thus, error checking has been traditionally considered inappropriate for
live video transmission because it often does not make sense for a recipient’s
computer to request a resend of a fractional second of video data. Resending
packets of lost video data does not make sense as it is often more appropriate to
simply accept the lost video data and continue watching the live video feed.
Therefore, UDP is still an often-favored protocol for live video transmission. 142
138 See generally AKAMAI, https://www.akamai.com/us/en/products/security/prolexicsolutions.jsp (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (discussing usage of BGP route advertisement change
to mitigate particular attacks).
139 Martin Pramatarov, Why Does DNS use UDP?, CLOUDNS (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:51 AM),
https://www.cloudns.net/blog/dns-use-udp/.
140 Divya Varnwal, Why UDP is preferred for Live Streaming, OODLES TECHNOLOGIES (May
27, 2016), https://www.oodlestechnologies.com/blogs/Why-UDP-is-preferred-for-Live-Str
eaming/.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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Video transmission involves a massive quantity of audio and visual data transfer.
Therefore, encryption can also be problematic in terms of slowing down video
transfer (certainly live, real-time transfer).
Historically, in the context of DNS requests, simple unencrypted UDP
requests were considered appropriate for simple IP address requests. After all,
when DNS over UDP was developed, transmission of an IP address likely did
not seem to constitute sensitive data requiring encryption. Regarding error
checking, certified mail requires a postal delivery person to confirm receipt,
which requires time and energy. If speed is the goal, then ordinary U.S. mail (i.e.,
UDP) is a good option. UDP was thus chosen for DNS queries years ago as
computers needed to quickly look up many IP addresses when a user browses
the web.
Another concept is data size. A DNS query has very little data: it is simply a
request for an IP address, so there is not much need for error checking if all data
was received. In contrast, other data transmissions, such as between a laptop
and a web server, may involve substantially more data exchange (e.g., files split
into multiple packets) and may thus benefit from TCP’s reliable delivery with
error checking. UDP was a sensible option for DNS queries during the
development of the internet. UDP provided fast and easy data transmission for
simple small packet DNS queries. UDP was certainly a practical option before
society developed substantial security and privacy concerns.
Encrypted DNS solutions use a process of encapsulation, conceptually
similar to the encapsulation principles described above with respect to VPNs.
As discussed previously, with DoH, the plain text DNS request is encrypted
within an HTTPS data packet, and the HTTPS packet is then sent to the DNS
server. As of this writing, there is considerable online debate of what type of
improved DNS is optimal from a privacy and security standpoint. From a policy
standpoint, rather than engaging in a highly technical debate of which specific
solutions are best, perhaps it is best for attorneys to consider the goals of an
improved DNS system in terms of privacy and security principles (and then
discuss options with the engineering community). Likely the two most important
principles for attorneys to raise in such discussions are authentication and
confidentiality, discussed below.
7. Authentication of DNS Servers
A first question to consider for future DNS systems is whether there is a
substantial need for a user’s computer to authenticate that it is communicating
with a legitimate DNS server (to reduce instances of DNS poisoning or hijacking
attacks). Authentication is provided by DNS using TLS associated with the
HTTPS protocol, so DoH is one form of improved DNS to consider.143
143
See DNSSEC-What Is It and Why Is It Important?, ICANN,
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dnssec-what-is-it-why-important-2019-03-05-en
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An argument can be made that authentication of many DNS servers is
unnecessary or perhaps not as important as confidentiality. In this regard, if the
user’s computer received an illegitimate IP address from an illegitimate DNS
server, HTTPS with its website certificate function, would hopefully alert the
user that the website lacks a valid certificate and warn the user not to continue
establishing a session with the website. DNS authentication could provide an
additional layer of defense. Another argument for lower priority of DNS server
authentication is that if a user’s computer is already so compromised to have its
DNS configuration altered, then that computer may already be so severely
compromised that it is past the point of no return from a security standpoint.
8. Confidentiality of DNS Requests
Confidentiality/privacy of DNS requests may be a more important goal than
authentication of DNS servers from a privacy standpoint (and authentication of
the DNS server could be considered more of a cybersecurity protection as
opposed to consumer privacy protection). DNS over HTTPS (DoH) increases
confidentiality of consumer DNS requests but, as explained above, DoH does
not ensure perfect confidentiality because even if the consumer’s ISP cannot see
the DNS queries, it can still examine other HTTPS packet headers to determine
the sites the consumer is visiting.
It would seem that a privacy advantage of encrypted DNS (DoH or other
variants of encrypted DNS) is that an ISP would need to sift through and
examine various packets to determine sites visited rather than easily seeing all
unencrypted DNS requests from a consumer’s computer. Historically, ISPs
could easily aggregate unencrypted DNS requests from consumers’ computers
and then sell that information (e.g., a list of IP addresses visited by each
consumer). With DoH, it is more difficult for the ISP to aggregate that
information because the ISP would need to survey and sift through each
consumer’s data packets, looking for destination IP addresses in those packets
and then perhaps translating those IP addresses into domain names. This seems
like considerably more work than simply maintaining a regular log of DNS
requests for each consumer and having that information ready for sale.
In essence, any form of encrypted DNS will not provide perfect
anonymity/confidentiality with respect to websites visited, but the extra work
required to extract this information might help consumers to some extent with
maintaining some greater level of privacy. Of course, as noted above, an
encrypted DNS mechanism may increase privacy relative to the ISP, but the
consumer is then subject to any privacy protections or possible abuses of the
provider of the encrypted DNS service.

(last visited Oct. 19, 2020) (explaining that DNSSec is another form of security augmented
DNS that authenticates the DNS server using public key encryption).
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F. EXPLORING DETAILS OF ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Prior discussion has briefly noted that asymmetric encryption (also known as
public key encryption) is used for authentication (e.g., authenticating a DNS
server or authenticating a digital signature, such as a third-party website
certificate in connection with HTTPS). Further details are provided in this
section.
For a thorough understanding of encryption, it is helpful to understand the
difference between conventional/symmetric encryption and asymmetric
encryption (also known as public key encryption). Recall from FIG. 1 that in
conventional encryption, the same key (such as a password) is used to both
encrypt and decrypt data. For example, a password on a laptop is a symmetric
key: assuming the laptop has local encryption turned on, the password is used
as the key to encrypt all the data and that same key is used to decrypt data.
Recall that a Caesar Cipher is likewise symmetric. Both the sender and
receiver of the message use essentially the same key to encrypt and decrypt (e.g.,
+ three letters for each character to encrypt and - three letters to decrypt).144 Put
another way, the encryption key and the decryption key are the same.
1. Asymmetric Encryption (also known as Public Key Encryption)
Asymmetric encryption differs from conventional encryption in that two
different keys are used: a private key and a public key that are mathematically
paired together. Either of the keys is used to encrypt the data, and the other key
is used to decrypt the data; however, data is generally encrypted using the public
key and decrypted using the private key in order to reduce cryptographic
attacks.145 The two unique paired keys are generated with an algorithm that is
sufficiently complex to generate a pair of keys unlike any other keys in the world
(e.g., such that it’s lottery odds for another computer anywhere in the world to
generate an identical pair of public and private keys).
Public key encryption was created as an alternative to symmetric key
encryption for convenience and security purposes. Suppose an attorney has 100
clients and wishes to exchange encrypted messages with each of them. Without
public key encryption, the attorney could share one conventional symmetric key
with all 100 clients. (The attorney and all of his 100 clients would use this one
shared key to encrypt all messages.) 100 people sharing a secret runs the risk that
the shared key might fall into the wrong hands, compromising confidentiality for
all 100 clients. To reduce this risk, the attorney could create 100 shared keys

144 Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 416, 427 (2012) (noting in symmetric encryption the same key is used on both ends of
the communication).
145
Public-key
cryptography,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publickey_cryptography (last updated Oct. 8, 2020, 3:37 PM).
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(one conventional key for each client), however this is burdensome to manage,
and there is still some risk of an individual client having her key stolen. Public
key encryption overcomes these problems: the attorney can share one public key
with all 100 clients. His clients can encrypt messages with the attorney’s public
key and send those messages to the attorney. The only party in the world who
can decrypt these messages is the attorney because he owns the corresponding
private key mathematically paired with his public key.
Besides the above advantage of avoiding the need to create 100 conventional
keys for each client, asymmetric encryption is also very useful for authenticating
the sender of a message. From a legal standpoint, authenticating the sender of a
message is useful in regard to the legal concept of nonrepudiation. 146 Repudiate
means to deny, and nonrepudiation means that the sender of a message is unable
to easily deny that he sent the message (message could encompass sending a
digital signature relative to a contract).147 With nonrepudiation, case law typically
assesses the effects of repudiation in a contract setting and provides that the nonrepudiating party may treat the repudiation as a breach and allow the nonrepudiating party to stop performing. 148 However, asymmetric encryption from
a tech standpoint is aimed at preventing a repudiation in the first place (such as
limiting the ability of a party to deny that he digitally signed a contract) because
asymmetric encryption mathematically proves that the party’s private key was
used to digitally sign.
This section will discuss asymmetric encryption in two contexts: (1)
authenticating the sender of an encrypted message in a generic sense, and (2)
authenticating website certificates (a component of the HTTPS protocol) as a
specific example of the process. Turning to the first example, assume the sender
of a message, Bob, has two unique keys. One is Bob’s private key, and the other
is Bob’s public key. Bob generates this pair of keys with a suitably complex
algorithm, such that the two keys are unique: as noted above, there are no other
keys in the world with matching values.

146 Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 974 F.Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“NRC
identified four major uses of cryptography: ensuring data integrity, authenticating users,
facilitating nonrepudiation (the linking of a specific message with a specific sender) and
maintaining confidentiality.”).
147 Advantages and Disadvantages of Asymmetric and Symmetric Cryptosystems, U. OF BABYLON,
www.uobabylon.edu.iq/eprints/paper_1_2264_649.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2019).
148 See Tower Investors, LLC v. 111 East Chestnut Consultants, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 927, 940
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (citing Yale Development Co. v. Aurora Pizza Hut, Inc., 95 Ill.App.3d 523,
526, 51 Ill.Dec. 409, 420 N.E.2d 823, 825 (1981)); 23 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 63:33, at
561–62 (4th ed. 2002)) (“[W]hen one party repudiates a contract, the nonrepudiating party is
excused from performing (see, e.g., Curtis Casket Co. v. D.A. Brown & Co., 259 Ill.App.3d 800,
806, 198 Ill.Dec. 145, 632 N.E.2d 204, 209 (1994)) or may continue to perform and seek
damages for the breach.”)
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2. Encrypting with Sender’s Private Key Authenticates the Message Sender
Assume Bob wishes to send a message to Alice and authenticate to Alice that
he is the sender. Bob will encrypt the message with his private key as seen in
FIG. 9 below.149 Building off of FIG. 9, further basic concepts of asymmetric
encryption are explained below.

Figure 9

3. The Encryption Step in Asymmetric Encryption is a “One-Way” Function. The Key
used to Encrypt Cannot then be Used to Decrypt
Once Bob encrypts his message with Bob’s private key, his private key cannot
be used to decrypt the message (see FIG. 10 below). The encryption algorithm
is designed so that encryption with the private key is mathematically a “one-way
function.”150 The only way to decrypt the message is by using Bob’s
corresponding public key. Bob has shared his public key with Alice and
potentially the general public. Learning the underlying mathematics supporting
this one-way function is likely overkill for most attorneys, but various sources
describe the underlying mathematics.151

149 See generally Public Keys and Private Keys in Public Key Cryptography, SECTIGO (June 9, 2020)
https://sectigo.com/resource-library/public-key-vs-private-key (discussing private key usage
as a means to authenticate).
150 See generally Public Key Encryption, TUTORIALSPOINT, https://www.tutorialspoint
.com/cryptography/public_key_encryption.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2019); Peter Swire &
Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH L. REV. 416, 427 (2012)
(noting that with public key/asymmetric encryption, the one-way function is a “calculation
that is much easier to execute in one direction than it is to reverse.”)
151 See generally The science of encryption: prime numbers and mod n arithmetic, UC BERKELEY,
https://math.berkeley.edu/~kpmann/encryption.pdf; Burt Kaliski, The Mathematics of the RSA
Public-Key Cryptosystem, RSA LABORATORIES, https://www.nku.edu/~christensen/the%20
mathematics%20of%20the%20RSA%20cryptosystem.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2020)
(describing relevant mathematics concepts).
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Figure 10 The Encryption Step is a One-Way Function
(in asymmetric encryption)

Another concept of asymmetric key encryption is that Bob is the only person
in the world with access to Bob’s private key (otherwise his private key would
not be “private”). Another concept is that only Bob’s corresponding public key
can be used to decrypt the message. Therefore, Bob’s public key and private key
are considered complementary. Given that Alice was able to decrypt the message
using Bob’s public key, this means mathematically that Bob’s private key was
used to encrypt the message. This is strong evidence that Bob sent the message,
and it will be difficult for Bob to argue that he did not send the message (Bob
could try to argue that someone else used his computer to send the message, but
this may be an uphill argument for Bob).
4. Encrypting with a Public Key Provides Confidentiality but not Authentication of
Sender
To further understand public key encryption, consider a scenario below (FIG.
11) in which Alice wishes to send Bob an encrypted communication, using one
of Bob’s keys. Her only option is to use Bob’s public key because Bob’s private
key is private to Bob. If Alice encrypts the message to Bob using Bob’s public
key, she can be assured that only Bob can decrypt the message because only
Bob’s private key can decrypt the message (only Bob has Bob’s private key).

Figure 11: Asymmetric Encryption Requires Two Keys

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss2/2

58

Volini: A Deep Dive into Technical Encryption Concepts to Better Understa
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TECHNICAL ENCRYPTION CONCEPTS

6/2/2021 11:58 PM

349

In the above FIG. 11, Alice can be fairly assured of the confidentiality of her
message because only Bob can decrypt the message using Bob’s private key.
However, in the above scenario Bob cannot authenticate that Alice was the
sender of the message because Alice used Bob’s public key. Bob can presumably
share his public key with the general public, so there is no way to know that Alice
was the party using the key. Important lessons from FIGS. 10 and 11 are that
(1) a private key is used to authenticate a sender and (2) encrypting with a public
key merely provides confidentiality but not authentication of the sender.
(Granted, using either key provides confidentiality.)
5. Using Asymmetric Encryption for Website Certificates
As noted previously, with the HTTPS protocol, the user’s browser
authenticates the legitimacy of the website/web server as an initial step (and the
website certificate can typically be viewed by clicking a padlock icon in the
browser bar). This authentication process relies on asymmetric encryption to
assess whether the website is trustworthy. If the website is unable to authenticate
itself to the browser with a valid certificate, then the browser will warn the user
to proceed at her own risk rather than immediately connecting to the website.152
The below FIG. 12 is a conceptual diagram:

Figure 12: Authenticating a Website via a Trusted Third-Party Certificate

The browser receives a certificate showing the public key of the certificate
authority (CA). The browser checks whether the certificate is valid essentially by
querying the CA. As a conceptual example, assume the browser uses the CA’s
public key to encrypt the certificate number and sends the resulting ciphertext to
the CA. Mathematically, the only party in the world that can decrypt the message
is the CA that owns the private key. Conceptually, if the CA can decrypt the
certificate number and send it back to the browser, this would demonstrate that
152 One can view a website’s certificate by clicking on the lock icon in the browser bar of
most browsers.
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the CA signed the certificate and that the website can thus be trusted as
legitimate. This example conveys a general, conceptual understanding of how a
certificate authority digitally signs a certificate with its private key for
authentication; however, more specific technical details can be explored as to the
exact mechanisms/digital signature standard used by particular certificate
authorities (which can involve use of hash value matching).153
6. Using Asymmetric and Conventional /Symmetric Encryption Together
Asymmetric encryption requires greater processing power in comparison to
conventional encryption.154 This should be intuitive because asymmetric
encryption requires use of two keys for the encryption/decryption process while
conventional encryption requires use of one key that is shared by both the sender
and receiver. Asymmetric encryption is therefore worthwhile for encrypting
small quantities of data, such as authenticating a digital signature, and
conventional encryption is preferred for encrypting and decrypting large
quantities of data.
In some instances, a system may allow authentication with asymmetric
encryption and also share a conventional key via asymmetric encryption.155 This
is what occurs with the very common HTTPS protocol, more specifically the
TLS component thereof. When a computer, such as a laptop, connects to a
remote web server via an HTTPS connection, the communication “session”
between the browser and the web server is established by a three-way handshake:
an initial step is for the browser to authenticate the web server is legitimate
through a third-party trusted certificate authority (as discussed previously) using
public key or asymmetric encryption. The TLS component of HTTPS then

153 See Security Tip (ST05-010): Understanding Web Certificates, CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (last revised Nov. 19, 2019), https://uscert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-010; Elaine B. Barker, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), NIST
(July 19, 2013), https://www.nist.gov/publications/digital-signature-standard-dss-2 (linking
to a technically detailed discussion of digital signatures, including discussion of hashing in this
context).
154 See The Difference Between Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption, SSLS.COM BLOG (Sept. 15,
2021), https://www.ssls.com/blog/the-difference-between-symmetric-and-asymmetric-encr
yption/ (describing symmetric encryption as faster than asymmetric).
155
Pretty
Good
Privacy,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#cite_note-3 (last updated Sept. 19, 2020, 9:40 AM) (“PGP can
be used to send messages confidentially. For this, PGP uses hybrid cryptosystem by combining
symmetric-key encryption and public-key encryption. The message is encrypted using a
symmetric encryption algorithm, which requires a symmetric key generated by the sender. The
symmetric key is used only once and is also called a session key. The message and its session
key are sent to the receiver. The session key must be sent to the receiver[,] so they know how
to decrypt the message, but to protect it during transmission it is encrypted with the receiver’s
public key. Only the private key belonging to the receiver can decrypt the session key[] and
use it to symmetrically decrypt the message.”).
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provides a shared symmetric key for the browser and web server to encrypt the
bulk of data they exchange during the session.156
Accordingly, a general principle to glean from the foregoing example is that
when one computer communicates with a second computer, it can first
authenticate the second computer using public key encryption. Because public
key encryption employs two keys, its processing overhead is too high for bulk
data exchange, so a symmetric key is preferable after authentication is done.
Therefore, after authentication, the two computers can share a symmetric key
for encrypted data exchange. Rather than sending the symmetric key in plain
text over the internet, the symmetric key can be encrypted with public key
encryption and sent to the other party. Thereafter, the two computers can use
the shared conventional key to encrypt and decrypt data shared between them.
III. SOME HIGH-LEVEL DISCUSSION RELEVANT TO ENCRYPTION
A. SOME HIGH-LEVEL LEGAL DISCUSSION OF ENCRYPTION

1. Some U.S. History of Surveillance
Regarding the history of surveillance in the United States, government and
private-party electronic eavesdropping of unencrypted data has been around for
a long time. Regarding private eavesdropping, in 1864 a stockbroker was
convicted of insider trading after he eavesdropped on corporate telegraph lines
in order to sell insider information.157 Regarding telephone lines, in the 1950s it
was relatively easy to hire a private detective to listen in on phone lines to
investigate adultery or the like.158 In the mid-1960s, government wiretapping of
phone lines was considered a necessary evil for matters of national security, but
civil rights concerns had certainly arisen with regard to routine eavesdropping on
phone lines for domestic law enforcement purposes.159 This history is relevant
because telegraph and telephone lines, much like the internet, were initially
designed without much thought given to security and privacy. Similarly, with
both the internet and these prior technologies, the public demand for security
and privacy arose largely after the open infrastructure was in place. The de facto

156 See generally Eric Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3,
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (Aug. 2018), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446
(providing a detailed discussion of TLS).
157April White, A Brief History of Surveillance in America, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Apr.
2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-surveillance-america-18096
8399/.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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implementation of security and privacy likely inspired the security and privacy by
design provisions of the EU’s GDPR.160
In recent years, the government has focused and expanded the use of
warrantless, mass surveillance techniques on unencrypted data to target and
arrest illegal immigrants.161 A major concern is the increasingly expansive
methods of mass surveillance Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
is permitted to use, without oversight, to arrest illegal immigrants. 162 Recently,
ICE has used social media, specifically Facebook, as a way to gather information
on an illegal immigrant where the information was ultimately used to secure an
arrest.163 Further, ICE is permitted to obtain information from local agencies
across the country, such as local and state jails, to access arrestees’ fingerprints
and cross-reference the fingerprints against immigration records. 164 ICE also
used state DMV databases to run face recognition searches on driver’s license
photos for comparison against the photos of undocumented immigrants. 165 The
surveillance methods do not end here, but also have consisted of ICE scanning
license plates in parking lots,166 obtaining addresses from utility companies, 167
and partnering with a facial recognition company to compare photos of illegal
immigrants to photos on social media.168 This is just a small glimpse into the
increasing danger people might face when it comes to their security/privacy

160 See GDPR Art. 25; see also supra text accompanying note 50 (describing the GDPR’s
privacy by design provisions).
161 See Taher Kameli and Chathan Vemuri, Immigrant Surveillance – The DHS’ Proposal to
Expand Biometric Collection To Limit Immigration, KAMELI & ASSOCIATES (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://kameli.com/2020/10/05/immigrant-surveillance/
(describing
that
internet
surveillance of immigrants has “metastasized considerably over the last two decades”).
162 Id.
163 Max Rivlin-Nadler, How Ice Uses Social Media To Surveil and Arrest Immigrants, THE
INTERCEPT (Dec. 22, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/12/22/ice-socialmedia-surveillance/.
164 Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Cruel New Era of Data Deportation, SLATE (Sept. 22, 2020, 1:40
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/09/palantir-ice-deportation-immigrant-surveillan
ce-big-data.html/.
165 Id. See also George Joseph, Where ICE Already Has Direct Lines to Law Enforcement
Databases
with
Immigrant
Data,
NPR
(May
12,
2017,
1:44
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/12/479070535/where-ice-already-hasdirect-lines-to-law-enforcement-databases-with-immigrant-d (describing ICE agents tapping
into “local law enforcement and drivers’ license databases”).
166 See Bedoya, supra note 163; Russell Brandom, Exclusive: ICE is about to start tracking license
plates across the US, THE VERGE (Jan. 26, 2018, 8:04 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/2018/1/26/16932350/ice-immigration-customs-license-plate-recognition-contract-vigilantsolutions.
167 Bedoya, supra note 165.
168 See Bedoya, supra note 165; Kim Lyons, Ice just signed a contract with facial recognition company
Clearview Al, THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020
/8/14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contract-privacy-immigration.
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being compromised and the expansive power and control the government may
exert.169
2. Some Legal History of Encryption
For centuries, encryption has been considered a tool of war. This dates back
as early as 405 B.C.E. when Lysander of Sparta sent encoded messages to military
personnel.170 In U.S. history, encryption likewise played a key role in both World
War I and II, including the Allied war effort cracking German and Japanese
cipher systems.171
In an effort to safeguard encryption technology for exclusive use by the U.S.
military, Congress passed the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. §
2278, which characterized encryption technology as a “munition,” requiring a
license from the U.S. Government prior to export to other countries in order to
avoid criminal penalties.172 In 1993, a federal grand jury in California opened a
criminal investigation against Philip Zimmerman to investigate whether the
worldwide distribution of his PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) encryption software
violated the Act, with the government ultimately dropping the charge.173
Ultimately, the U.S. government in 1999 communicated a concrete change in
policy, allowing export of encryption products without restriction. 174 This was
based in part on First Amendment challenges to the Act, as well as the U.S.
government ultimately conceding that strong encryption was vital to the
operation of the Internet by consumers and businesses to protect data.175
Regarding a First Amendment challenge to regulating the export of
encryption, Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State176 provides a helpful discussion of
the history of the government’s attempt to regulate encryption, initially through
the Arms Export Control Act and its accompanying regulations, and then
through the Export Administration Act of 1979 and its accompanying
regulations.177 In Bernstein, a mathematician sought a declaratory judgment that

169 Snowden Leaks: a Summary of the NSA Programs, COGIPAS, https://www.cogipas.com
/snowden-leaks-summary-of-nsa-programs/ (last updated July 11, 2018).
170 Ronald J. Stay, Cryptic Controversy: U.S. Government Restrictions on Cryptography Exports and
the Plight of Philip Zimmermann, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 581, 582 (1997), available at
https ://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss2/14.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 586 (noting the enforcement of the statute by the Secretary of State via the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) under 22 C.F.R. 120.1 (1995)).
173 Stay, supra note 169.
174 Swire & Ahmad, supra note 143.
175 Id. at 425.
176 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
177 As explained in Bernstein, On December 9, 1996, President Clinton, via Executive Order
13026, transferred jurisdiction over the export of nonmilitary encryption products to the
Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–
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his publication of encryption algorithms was First Amendment protected,
thereby negating enforcement under the regulations of the Arms Export Control
Act and the regulations of the Export Administration Act.178 The court sided
with the Plaintiff, holding that the encryption regulations were unconstitutional
prior restraints in violation of the First Amendment. 179 The decision in Bernstein
and related cases, along with other public debate, likely paved the way for the
U.S. Government in 1999 to ultimately forego regulation of commercial
encryption products.180
3. Encryption and EU-US Data Transfers
In 2020, the European Court of Justice invalidated the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield program, which was one mechanism allowing participating U.S.
organizations to import data from the EU concerning EU data subjects.181 The
Privacy Shield program was essentially invalidated over concerns that EU
residents’ data did not have adequate privacy protections to protect from U.S.
government surveillance in the wake of the Edward Snowden leaks concerning
widespread U.S. government surveillance of civilians.182 Snowden’s leaks
revealed the U.S. government’s collection of vast amounts of civilian data, one
example being the government’s project prism183 program which collected
massive amounts of emails and search histories.184 Interestingly, Snowden has
reported that widespread use of encryption is likely the primary tool that could

2411 (1991) and the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.1–.10 (1997).
Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1291.
178 Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1291.
179 Id. at 1308.
180 See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 143 (noting at page 416 that “[i]n 1999, . . . the
administration shifted position to allow largely unrestricted export of encryption technologies.
Encryption law and policy discussions largely faded from view.”)
181 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release 91/20, Court of Justice of the
European Union, the Council and the Parliament on Invalidating Decision 2016/1250 (July
16, 2020), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-07/cp200091
en.pdf.
182 Adam Satariano, E.U. Court Strikes Down Trans-Atlantic Data Transfer Pact, NEW YORK
TIMES (July 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/business/eu-data-transferpact-rejected.html.
183 The Prism program was authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Services Act (FISA). See United States v. Mohammad, 339 F. Supp. 3d 724, 744 (N.D. Ohio
2018) (discussing Section 702 data collection under Prism, generally).
184 Another example is the NSA’s Bullrun program designed to decrypt HTTPS and other
communications.
Bullrun
(decryption
program),
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bullrun_(decryption_program) (last updated Jan. 15 2021, 4:36
PM).
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be used to curb much of this massive governmental and private party
dataveillance.185
In August 2020, in the wake of the Privacy Shield invalidation, the German
Data Protection Authority (DPA) of the German federal state of BadenWürttemberg issued guidance on international data transfers for ensuring safe
transfer of EU residents’ data into the U.S. The German DPA guidelines
provided a number of suggested safeguards to protect EU data flowing into the
U.S., including encryption for which “only the data exporter has the key” and
which “cannot be broken by U.S. [intelligence] services.”186 This suggested
safeguard reflects an interesting shift because U.S. government policy may now
require support of un-surveillable communications, if it wishes to allow U.S.
companies to engage in substantial online commerce with Europe. In a sense,
the strong European desire for personal privacy is continuing to influence U.S.
policy.187
4. Privacy Interests Promoted by Strong Encryption versus Law Enforcement’s Desire
for a “Front Door”
a. Arguments for a Front Door
For decades, a debate has been ongoing over whether federal law
enforcement should be provided a “back door” (today called a front door) to
encryption products provided by tech companies, such as Apple’s iPhone.188
185 See Lauren C. Williams, Edward Snowden Says Encryption Is The Only Way To Counter Mass
Surveillance,
THINK
PROGRESS
(Mar.
10,
2014,
6:57
PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/edward-snowden-says-encryption-is-the-only-way-tocounter-mass-surveillance-ee450433dca8/ (in which Snowden notes that “mass surveillance
by businesses and governments is the biggest threat to national and individual security. During
the hour-long discussion, Snowden focused on how mass surveillance and indiscriminate data
collection by both erodes individual privacy and national security. Given the intelligence
community’s unwillingness to reform their tactics, the only way to combat surveillance is for
consumers and the tech world to expand the use of encryption and other cybersecurity tools.”
Similarly, at a presentation hosted by the American Civil Liberties Union, Edward Snowden
described encryption as “the defense against the dark arts for the digital realm”).
186 See German DPA Issues Guidance on Data Transfers Following Schrems II, HUNTON ANDREWS
KURTH (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2020/09/02/german-dpaissues-guidance-on-data-transfers-following-schrems-ii/
(describing
other
technical
safeguards: anonymization or pseudonymization, where “only the data exporter can reidentify the data.”).
187 As an example, the California Consumer Privacy Protection Act is widely regarded as
inspired by the European General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR), considering its post
GDPR enactment with various similarities in privacy protections (e.g., requiring consumer
consent to personal data collection, right to deletion, etc.).
188 Kif Leswing, Apple’s Fight with Trump and the Justice Department is about more than two iPhones,
CNBC (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/apple-fbi-backdoorbattle-is-about-more-than-two-iphones.html.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

65

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 2
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

356

6/2/2021 11:58 PM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 28:2

Currently, a law enforcement front door exists with respect to wiretap orders
under CALEA (Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act), which
applies to telecommunications carriers, including providers of telephone service,
Broadband Internet Service, and providers of VoIP.189 Such providers are
statutorily required to modify and design their technologies with sufficient
capabilities to assist such orders. Therefore, law enforcement’s current push is
for essentially a larger front door, to encompass other technologies not reached
by CALEA, such as smartphone devices or cloud providers (e.g., Dropbox or
encrypted WhatsApp messages). 190
In an October 2019 speech, FBI Director Christopher Wray raised concerns
over warrant-proof, end-to-end encryption and disclosed that it wants a “front
door” to lawfully access communications with a warrant from a neutral judge
upon meeting Fourth Amendment requirements.191 Similarly, in 2016 FBI
Director James Comey publicly pushed for a backdoor to Apple’s iPhone while
seeking a court order under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to compel Apple
to unlock an encrypted iPhone 5C used by a San Bernardino attacker in 2015.192
The desired front door would require tech companies to facilitate lawful
access upon law enforcement obtaining judicial approval. Perhaps the bestselling point for providing a front door is the important need to prevent or
prosecute cases of child sexual exploitation or terrorism. It’s conceivable that a
free society could potentially tolerate allowing some unmonitored drug
trafficking communications, essentially weighing society’s need for privacy as
greater than the need to uncover certain low-level crimes. However, it would
seem that a civilized society should not tolerate widespread undiscoverable
distribution of videos and other imagery of infants and toddlers subjected to sex
acts.193 FBI Director Christopher Wray noted in his October 2019 speech that

189 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-andlicensing-division/general/communications-assistance (last updated Oct. 20, 2020) (noting
“[c]ommunications services and facilities utilizing Circuit Mode equipment, packet mode
equipment, facilities-based broadband Internet access providers and providers of
interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service are all subject to CALEA.”).
190 See Opderbeck, supra note 80, at 1671 (noting many cloud providers, such as Dropbox,
do not provide internet access, which brings them outside the scope of CALEA.).
191 Christopher Wray, Finding a Way Forward on Lawful Access Bringing Child Predators Out of
the Shadows, FBI (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/finding-a-way-forwardon-lawful-access.
192 See Matthias Schulze, Clipper Meets Apple v. FBI-A Comparison of the Cryptography Discourses
from
1993
and
2016,
5
COGITATIO
1
(2017),
available
at
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/805; Opderbeck,
supra note 80, at 1671 (discussing the government’s usage of the All Writs Act to fill in the gap
is not covered by CALEA).
193 A fairly horrific example is described in Olivia Solon, Child sexual abuse images and online
exploitation surge during the pandemic, NBC NEWS (April 23, 2020, 3:01 PM), https:
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Facebook has provided more than 90% of the referrals received by the National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children, which “now receives more than 18
million referrals” per year.194 Director Wray expressed concern that if Facebook
and other tech companies end up providing warrant-proof end-to-end
encryption, they will willfully blind themselves to all content and eliminate the
possibility of lawfully accessing particularly egregious criminal content. 195 He
notes that Facebook moving in this direction would transform Facebook “from
the main provider of child exploitation tips to a dream come true for predators
and child pornographers.”196
One source indicates that policymakers generally favor strong encryption
with exceptional, warrant-based access, while the tech community generally
rejects this view, essentially arguing that strong encryption technologies should
have no back door vulnerability built-in.197 Certainly, the Internet is a powerful
tool that can be used for good or evil purposes. Therefore, this debate over an
encryption front door will likely continue indefinitely (perhaps gaining the
greatest support in the wake of any significant terror attack), with legislators
butting heads with the tech community.
b. Arguments Against a Front Door
Various arguments against a law enforcement front (or back) door have been
advanced, perhaps based on a growing distrust in the society of governments
(and businesses) having unfettered access to personal data.198 Some key
arguments against a front door include: (1) concern over law enforcement creep
where the front door is established for very serious crimes or terrorism but
eventually creeps into surveillance of lower level crimes, thereby creating a police

//www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/child-sexual-abuse-images-online-exploitation-surgeduring-pandemic-n1190506 (explaining that a zoom bomber delivered explicit video of a
sexual assault on an infant to attendees of a virtual conference on climate change).
194 Wray, supra note 190.
195 Wray, supra note 190.
196 David Shortell, FBI director claims encryption plan would make Facebook a ‘dream come true’ for
child pornographers, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/04/politics/fbi-facebookchild-encryption/index.html (Oct. 4, 2019, 3:22 PM).
197 See Schulze, supra note 191, at 59 (noting “[p]olicymakers in general favor strong
encryption with exceptional, warrant-based access while the tech community replies that the
mathematics either support secure encryption without government backdoors or exceptional
access with significantly less security.”).
198 See Ryan Budish, Herbert Burkert, & Urs Gasser, Encryption Policy and Its International
Impacts: A Framework for Understanding Extraterritorial Ripple Effects, HOOVER INSTITUTION
(2018),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/36291726/budish_webreadypdf%
202.pdf?sequence=1 (“Apple’s decision to offer end-to-end encrypted messaging and full
device encryption, both enabled by default, could be seen as a direct response to declining
consumer trust and concerns over NSA surveillance.”).
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state;199 (2) concern over any safeguards being ignored by law enforcement and
a lack of law enforcement transparency with the public in terms of currently used
forensics tools and their effectiveness;200 (3) concern over a backdoor being
leaked and exploited by bad actors;201 (4) a related concern that it’s
technologically difficult to design breakable encryption products that are still
considered to provide strong protection; (5) concern over U.S. consumers
purchasing foreign encryption products, thereby reducing sales of potentially
inferior U.S. products, thereby creating anticompetitive effects for U.S.
products;202 (6) concern that overseas sales of U.S. IT hardware or software may
decline if a perception exists that they provide weak security on account of U.S.
mandated vulnerability;203 (6) recognition that law enforcement has essentially
lost the cryptowars of the 1990s; (7) concern that backdoors are often mandated
by authoritarian regimes to surveil a population in violation of their fundamental
human rights;204 (8) concern that on balance, society (both businesses and
individuals) is safer when provided with the strongest encryption products;205 (9)
an argument that law enforcement can use other investigative techniques to
discover high priority terrorist activity and child molestation without infringing
privacy of encrypted communications.206
199 See Schulze, supra note 191, at 58-59 (“[A]gencies might dig up cases to mandate
companies to build in backdoors for more trivial reasons than fighting terrorism, a
phenomenon called function creep.”).
200 See Ellen Nakashima, FBI and NSA violated surveillance law or privacy rules, a federal judge
found, MSN (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/fbi-and-nsa-violatedsurveillance-law-or-privacy-rules-a-federal-judge-found/ar-BB18IVqI; see also Redacted, 402 F.
Supp. 3d 45 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2018) (finding “the FBI’s querying and minimization
procedures, as implemented, to be inconsistent with statutory minimization requirements and
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment”).
201 See Schulze, supra note 191, at 57 (noting “[b]usiness actors are more afraid of the
potential future effects of the government regulating encryption, which might result in the
widespread use of inferior technology.”).
202 See Ryan Budish, Herbert Burkert, & Urs Gasser, Encryption Policy and Its International
Impacts: A Framework for Understanding Extraterritorial Ripple Effects, HOOVER INSTITUTION
(2018), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/36291726/budish_webreadypdf%202
.pdf?sequence=1 at page 9: For example, analysts predicted that the economic impact on U.S.
companies attributable to the Snowden leaks was in the range of $35 billion to $180 billion in
lost revenue.
203 Id.
204 See Schulze, supra note 191, at 57 (noting the argument that “control of encryption
technology is a norm of authoritarian regimes and police states and therefore inappropriate in
democracies.”)
205 See Schulze, supra note 191, at 59 (statement of Form NSA Director Michael Hayden)
(“America is simply more secure with unbreakable end-to-end encryption.”).
206 See Christopher Soghoian, Book Note, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and
Government Back Doors In The Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 360, 399 (2010)
(“[I]f a suspect is important enough, let the police dedicate the significant manpower to break
into her home in order to install bugs. Given the finite limit to the financial and human
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One example that exemplifies some of the arguments against a front (or back
door) for the government or law enforcement is shown by the recent SolarWinds
hack. A few sources suggest that there may have been a weakness on account of
government backdoors that took part in allowing the success of the attack.207
The SolarWinds hack raises a question of whether a mandated backdoor does
more harm than good. For example, one would need to balance the backdoor’s
effectiveness in detection/prevention of some level of criminal activity versus
the harm caused by a massive data breach potentially enabled by the backdoor.
Regarding a lack of public transparency over existing tools, law enforcement
is not informing the public that law enforcement across the country is regularly
able to break into phones; even small police departments that have the capability
themselves or that simply send the phones to a lab. 208 Perhaps it’s
understandable for law enforcement not to publicly disclose the investigative
tools in its arsenal and its success rate. However, law enforcement’s sales pitch
to the public makes it sound like the police are never able to break into encrypted
phones, and this is not true. Jennifer Granick, a cybersecurity lawyer at the
American Civil Liberties Union explains “Law enforcement at all levels has
access to technology that it can use to unlock phones. That is not what we’ve
been told.”209 The truth it would seem is that sometimes they can break in and
sometimes they can’t, with one Manhattan prosecutor explaining “we may
unlock it in a week, we may not unlock it for two years, or we may never unlock
it.”210
If law enforcement continues to lose the cryptowars with privacy interests
outweighing crime detection, then perhaps a fundamental privacy principle is
taking shape equivalent to the English and U.S. criminal concept of Blackstone’s
resources available to law enforcement agencies, such a change in the balance of power, by
raising the effective cost of such surveillance, would force investigators to prioritize their
targets, and shy away from fishing expeditions.”).
207 Shawna Chen, Dozens of Treasury email accounts breached in SolarWinds hack, AXIOS (Dec.
22, 2020), https://www.axios.com/solarwinds-hack-treasury-email-accounts-breached-e6a24
240-2795-4c09-9056-b53f20e47f37.html (statement of Ron Wyden, Treasury Finance
Committee Ranking Member) (“Finally, after years of government officials advocating for
encryption backdoors, and ignoring warnings from cybersecurity experts who said that that
encryption keys become irresistible targets for hackers, the USG has now suffered a breach
that seems to involve skilled hackers stealing encryption keys from USG servers.”); see also,
Glyn Moody, The widening SolarWinds debacle shows why the reckless idea of backdooring encryption must
be
dropped
forever,
PRIVACY
NEWS
ONLINE
(Dec.
24,
2020),
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/the-widening-solarwinds-debacle-shows-whythe-reckless-idea-of-backdooring-encryption-must-be-dropped-forever/ (“Key to the
intrusion was the insertion of malicious code into the Orion network monitoring software
from SolarWinds – a backdoor in software that was very widely used and trusted.”).
208 Jack Nicas, The Police Can Probably Break Into Your Phone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/iphone-encryption-police.html.
209 Id.
210 Id.
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ratio: “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”
Blackstone’s ratio is credited with the development of the beyond reasonable
doubt standard in criminal law and likely influenced the development of other
constitutional protections within the United States.211 Roughly applying this
same principle to privacy, one could argue that it is preferable to allow a certain
number of criminal communications that cannot be surveyed rather than
undermine the privacy interests of millions of law-abiding civilians. If the United
States supports un-surveillable communications, this could potentially overrule
law enforcement’s long-standing request to have a readily available encryption
backdoor, which companies such as Apple have resisted.212 While this extremely
pro-privacy view is appealing, it could pose some dangers as noted below. If a
strong terrorism concern exists regarding EU-US transfers, however, then law
enforcement could potentially order a tech provider to hand over the key via the
court system. That is, assuming the tech providers maintains the key or the
ability to decrypt.
If privacy interests favor warrant proof encryption technologies, this raises a
fundamental question of the value of privacy in a free society balanced against
the need or desire for law enforcement to investigate criminal or terrorist activity.
Likewise, this raises a larger related question, beyond the scope of this article, of
what it means to live in a free society and how privacy rights fit within that free
society. Certainly, if the government or private organizations (or some
combination of the two) can easily review everyone’s communications from both
a routing standpoint (i.e., the “from” and “to” fields of a data packet) and a
content standpoint (i.e., the payload of a data packet), then this unfettered access
to emails, text messages, voicemails, search history, and current and past location
may exemplify a society that is not free. Strong encryption can thus be a helpful
tool to increase freedom through privacy of communications, hiding not only
the routing info and identity of the communicating parties (e.g., “from” and “to”
info) but also the contents of the messages themselves (e.g., payload of data
packets). U.S. government policy, both legislatively and judicially, may thus
continue to shift toward stronger protection of personal data.213
Interestingly, the New York Civil Liberties Union issued a report in 2020
discussing how attorneys can increase their use of encryption to protect client

211 See Daniel Epps, One Last Word on the Blackstone Principle, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 34
(2016) (discussing and critiquing Blackstone’s ratio).
212 Lauren Feiner, Republican senators introduce bill that tech advocates warned would weaken privacy,
CNBC (June 24, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/24/gop-senatorsintroduce-bill-that-would-create-a-backdoor-for-encryption.html.
213 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (noting that “many of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly
every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the intimate.” In my view, this evidences the
judicial awareness of highly personal data maintained by many people in the United States and
the need to safeguard this same data.).
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information from being sucked up by mass government surveillance particularly
in criminal defense representation. 214 The report notes that “Privileged and
confidential attorney-client communication is illegally being recorded as a matter
of course by contractors working for the government, like the telephone system
contractor Securus.”215 This report supports that there is a real concern in both
the EU and the U.S. over warrantless, and technologically easy, government
surveillance of communications and the need to protect communications from
same. Interestingly, the New York Civil Liberties Union report encourages the
use of open-source encryption tools that would seem to remove the possibility
of a private party providing a back door to its encryption products. 216
c. Three Hypothetical Privacy Scenarios to Facilitate Discussion
Three hypothetical scenarios are provided to stimulate discussion with regard
to privacy of online communications and stored data: (1) a no privacy extreme;
(2) a pro privacy extreme; and (3) a balanced privacy scheme (shown in Tables
1-3 below).

1. Hypothetical “No Privacy” Extreme (i.e., a transparent internet)
Data in
Transit or
Stored
Data?

Information
type

Encryption
state

Effect

Notes

Data in
Transit

Routing
information*
(header
to/from info in
data packets)

Unencrypted

Sender and
receiver easily
observed (by
private parties
or
government)

Similar to
posting
to/from
messages on a
public bulletin
board

214 See Jonathan Stribling-Uss, Legal Cybersecurity in the Digital Age, NEW YORK CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION at *3 (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field _
documents/20200924_nyclu_legalcybersecurity_final_2.pdf (the report outlining “concrete,
accessible steps that legal organizations, especially criminal defense lawyers, can do right now
to ensure their attorney client communications are not sucked up into a government
surveillance database or stolen by hackers.”).
215 Id. at 14-15.
216 Id. at 19 (“[A]ttorneys should seek open-source products whose source code can be
publicly accessed and vetted –to ensure there are no secret, government-prompted flaws that
risk revealing client information.”).
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Content (i.e.,
data payload of
packets)

Unencrypted

All contents
easily
observed

Data stored in
the cloud

Unencrypted

Data can be
easily viewed
by the cloud
provider or
anyone else

[Vol. 28:2

This complete
lack of
confidentiality
is generally
unacceptable.

2. Hypothetical “Pro Privacy” Extreme
Data in
Transit or
Stored
Data?

Information
type

Encryption
state

Effect

Notes

Data in
Transit

Routing
information*
(header
to/from info in
data packets)

Encrypted.
Tech platform
has no key
and maintains
no records

Sender and
receiver not
observable by
eavesdroppers

Content (i.e.,
data payload of
packets)

Encrypted.
Tech platform
has no key
and maintains
no records

Contents not
observable by
eavesdroppers

Imagine all
internet users
using a VPN
service that
encrypts
routing info
and payload of
packets and
maintains no
records of
activity

Data stored in
the cloud

Encrypted. no
decryption key
held by the
provider

Data can’t be
viewed by the
cloud
provider,
government,
or other
parties

Stored
Data

Analogous to
leasing a safe
at a bank that
maintains no
key (only the
tenant has the
key)

3. Hypothetical Balanced Privacy Scenario
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Data in
Transit or
Stored
Data?

Information
type

Encryption
state

Effect

Notes

Data in
Transit

Routing
information*
(header
to/from info
in data
packets)

Encrypted,
but tech
platform has
a key

Sender and
receiver not
observable by
eavesdroppers
unless
decryption key
used

Content (i.e.,
data payload
of packets)

Encrypted,
but tech
platform has
a key

Contents not
observable by
eavesdroppers
unless
decryption key
used

An encryption
back door is
problematic
(inherently
vulnerable).
Government
and private
actors tempted
to use it
unethically?

Data stored in
the cloud

Encrypted,
but tech
platform has
a key

Data not
observable
unless
decryption key
used

Stored
Data

363

Consider a bank
and its customer
each having a
key to a safety
deposit box. In
theory, the key is
accessed through
legal process
only where
serious crimes
are suspected
(access possible
in civil litigation
too?).

Privacy advocates might encourage completely private communications
(Table 2) that have no possibility of ever being viewed by government or private
parties. A completely private communication might involve no retrievable
record of who contacted whom as well as no access to the contents of the
communication. This would constitute the ultimate in privacy where for example
an email provider or other tech platform removes its ability to access routing
information or content. This way, even if the tech platform is ordered to provide
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such information, it will not have that capability. However, such ultimate privacy
may arguably have the potential to cause too much harm.
While 100% private communications (Table 2) would advance privacy, some
might argue for a back door (Table 3), asserting that the internet, as a powerful
tool for large-scale good or evil activity, requires regulation. Perhaps a balanced
view (Table 3) is that society would benefit from development of encrypted
online communication platforms that are not easily susceptible to eavesdropping
by government or private parties. Ideally, excellent privacy could be provided
where civilians could use a platform that provides adequate assurance that neither
the platform nor the government will see their communications without judicial
process and that the platform will only hand over the decryption key upon receipt
of a judicial order to do so. In balancing privacy interests, courts should continue
to take into account whether the suspected crime is serious enough to warrant
the privacy invasion. Perhaps judicially ordered decryption would be most
appropriate where the suspected criminal activity would support a felony rather
than misdemeanor charge to reduce the potential for governmental overreach
with respect to the bulk of society’s private communications and stored data?
Another concept to explore another day is whether civilians might be notified
when their data has been examined at the conclusion of an investigation where
no charge has been filed. This level of transparency might reduce unnecessary
warrantless snooping of civilian data. Developing some form of transparency,
perhaps through independent third-party auditing, might ease concerns over the
potential for unlawful eavesdropping by federal agents.217
As discussed, many policy makers seem to favor legislative reform that would
support development of a front door with suitable safeguards, while
technologists seem overwhelmingly opposed to any legislative front door
requirement. This article does not take a strong position on the issue, but offers
a final thought that while a balanced approach sounds ideal, it might not be
feasible if mandated backdoors end up doing more harm than good. Therefore,
privacy interests may continue to outweigh law enforcement’s desire for a front
door.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing should provide attorneys with some helpful background on
encryption concepts from a technical and legal standpoint, which should be
helpful in their efforts to provide effective leadership at the intersection of
technology and law.

217 For an example of alleged government abuse, see Trevor Aaronson, A Declassified
Court Ruling Shows How the FBI Abused NSA Mass Surveillance Data, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 10,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/10/10/fbi-nsa-mass-surveillance-abuse/.
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